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Abstract. Peter Millican and Branden Thornhill-Miller have recently argued that 
contradictions between different religious belief systems, in conjunction with the 
host of defeaters based on empirical research concerning alleged sources of evidence 
for ‘perceived supernatural agency’, render all ‘first-order’, that is actual, religious 
traditions positively irrational, and a source of discord on a global scale. However, 
since the authors recognise that the ‘secularisation thesis’ appears to be incorrect, 
and that empirical research provides evidence that religious belief also has beneficial 
individual and social effects, they put forward a  hypothesis of a  ‘second-order 
religious belief ’, with Universalist overtones and thus free of intergroup conflict, and 
free of irrationality, since supported (solely) by the Fine-Tuning Argument. While 
granting most of their arguments based on empirical research and embracing the 
new paradigm of the atheism/religion debate implicit in their paper, I contend that 
Millican’s and Thornhill-Miller’s proposal is unlikely to appeal to religious believers, 
because it misconstrues the nature and grounds of religious belief. I suggest that their 
hypothesis may be refined by taking into account a view of axiologically grounded 
religious belief that I refer to as ‘agatheism’, since it identifies God or the Ultimate 
Reality with the ultimate good (to agathon). I submit that agatheistic religious belief 
which is explicitly or implicitly presupposed in the first-order religious traditions as 
their doxastic core can be shown to be rational, and allows us to frame the relations 
between fundamental beliefs of adherents of various religions and worldviews in 
a non-conflictual way, conducive of their constructive participation in the global 
ethical discourse.
For science can only ascertain what is, but not what should be, and outside of its 
domain value judgments of all kinds remain necessary. Religion, on the other hand, 
deals only with evaluations of human thought and action [...] If one conceives of 
religion and science according to these definitions then a  conflict between them 
appears impossible. (Albert Einstein)1
1 Albert Einstein, “Science and Religion”, in Out of My Later Years (New York: 
Philosophical Library/Open Road, 2011 (first published in 1950)), pp. 37-38.
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Darwin didn’t preach Darwinism. His theory does not dictate any specific form of 
behaviour. Nature is not interested in individuals. It has no moral content at all. 
But to be a human being is to have certain moral ideals, in which case we must 
resist certain natural processes in a way that lions and tigers can’t. And therefore 
what can be called ideology can be made independent of scientific findings. Goals 
are not provided by science. (Isaiah Berlin)2
I. SEARCHING FOR A NEW PARADIGM 
OF THE ATHEISM/RELIGION DEBATE
In this time, when the tide of us-versus-them mentality is once again on 
the rise across the globe, it is refreshing to come across a careful study of 
the epistemology of religious belief marked by intellectual empathy and the 
spirit of dialogue.3 Co-authored by Peter Millican, an analytic philosopher 
and a  leading Hume scholar, representing “a  sceptical and naturalistic 
attitude to religion”, and by his Oxford colleague, Branden Thornhill-
Miller, a  psychologist “sympathetic to religious claims and informed by 
contemporary empirical research”, the work is itself “a product of a dialogue 
between two contrasting points of view”, conducted with the aim to 
“encourage more progress in interreligious dialogue and in the naturalism/
supernaturalism debate” (p.  2). While not being in full agreement as to 
whether and how “to accommodate our natural religious tendencies within 
our intellectual lives”, both authors agree that “there is plenty of scope for 
reasonable debate here, and the verdict is less clear cut than is commonly 
supposed by enthusiasts on either side” (p.  5). As such the discussion 
provides a new model of how philosophy of religion may be practiced, and 
is an anti-thesis of the usual highly-charged polemics between ‘new atheists’ 
and ‘full-time apologists’, shooting at each other in the preaching-to-the-
choir manner and with predictable results.
True to the spirit of their own call to dialogue and constructive debate, 
while outlining “some of the possibilities and rational limits of supernatural 
religious belief ” and concluding that “the contradictions between different 
religious belief systems, in conjunction with new understandings of the 
cognitive forces that shape their common features, persuasively challenge 
2 Isaiah Berlin in a 1974 BBC interview with John Merson; cf. The Isaiah Berlin Virtual 
Library: <http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/lists/interviews/> [accessed 1/10/2015].
3 Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican, “The Common-Core/Diversity 
Dilemma: Revisions of Humean Thought, New Empirical Research, and the Limits 
of Rational Religious Belief ”, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 7, no. 1 
(2015), 1-49. Subsequent references to this work are included parenthetically in text.
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the rationality of most kinds of supernatural belief ” (p.  1),4 the authors 
bother to put themselves in the shoes of the traditional religious believers in 
order to articulate what might be the epistemically best option available to 
those who find themselves unable “to ‘bite the bullet’ of cool, parsimonious 
reason and learn to live with a godless world” (p. 46). The outcome of this 
exercise in intellectual empathy is a  hypothetical religious stance which 
Thornhill-Miller and Millican call ‘second-order religion’ or ‘second-order 
supernaturalism’, leaving the term ‘first-order religion’ to designate the 
actual historical religions. The second-order religion is supposed to be 
a kind of ‘thin’ theism or deism (perhaps too thin, as I will argue, to deserve 
to be called ‘religion’) supported solely by the Fine-Tuning Argument for 
the existence of God which builds on the recent “apparent discovery of 
certain ‘anthropic coincidences’ in the laws of physics” (p. 4), without which 
the existence of life in general, and of creatures like humans in particular, 
would be impossible. No other theistic argument deserves, in their opinion, 
such credit,5 and in the face of numerous defeaters grounded in “empirical 
research concerning intercessory prayer, religious experience, near-death 
experience, and various cognitive biases, such as agency detection, theory of 
mind, egocentric and confirmation bias”, in addition to the aforementioned 
“mutual contradictions of first-order supernaturalism” (p. 1), no first-order 
religion can be supported by a  rational argument, and therefore  – as is 
implied throughout the paper – commitment to the truth-claims of some 
particular religious tradition is positively irrational.6
At this stage a reader might ask herself, how does this line of argument 
differ from other all-out philosophical criticisms of religious belief? 
Arguably there are at least two aspects to Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s 
approach to the subject matter which deserve attention as containing the 
germs of two interesting projects that might contribute to rejuvenation 
of the philosophical atheism/religion debate, potentially turning it 
into something more meaningful and fruitful than it usually is. Firstly, 
Thornhill-Miller and Millican explore not just the question of “the rational 
limits” of religious belief, but also of the “possibilities” of rational religious 
4 In all cases, including in quotations, when emphasis is added by the use of italics, the 
italics are mine, unless specified otherwise.
5 Cf. footnote 143 on p. 47.
6 The position adopted by the authors of the paper regarding the rationality of 
commitment to particular religious creeds makes it clear that the declaration about 
Branden Thornhill-Miller’s “sympathetic attitude” towards religious claims is not meant 
to imply that he is a classical theist, but rather someone attuned to religious Universalism, 
in which case his own religious views may be consistent with the epistemology of 
religious belief advocated in this paper.
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belief, and their attempt at delineating the sphere of what they consider 
to be a  clearly irrational epistemic stance, from the sphere where “it is 
not obviously unreasonable” (p. 47) to be religiously committed, is clearly 
genuine. Their restrictive approach to the justificatory grounds of religious 
belief may disappoint some defenders of the rationality of religious belief, 
but the vision of advocates of various metaphysical outlooks engaging in 
intellectually honest and genuinely philosophical  – rather than merely 
rhetorical  – debate, involving readiness to admit that there are objective 
limits to the strengths of the arguments supporting one’s own position, may 
provide a model of a constructive atheism/religion debate.
There is, however, a second reason to look upon Thornhill-Miller’s and 
Millican’s project as innovative. It appears that the main rationale behind 
their going to such lengths to formulate their hypothesis of second-order 
religion, although none of the authors fully identifies with the metaphysical 
stance it entails, is that they find it less “dogmatic” and more “tolerant” 
than the first-order religions, “offering a  more cooperation- and humility-
enhancing understanding of religious diversity in a  tense and precarious 
globalised age” (pp.  1-2). This explicit concern with the far-reaching 
existential consequences of fundamental beliefs, and the awareness 
how much may be at stake in the dialogue between adherents of various 
worldviews and religions, as well as the appeal to intellectual humility, make 
one think that here at last is a publication that might open a new chapter 
in the philosophical debate about doxastic pluralism, that is not primarily 
apologetic in nature, but focused on the relevance of pluralism for the global 
ethical discourse about the challenges facing humanity in the global age.
It is this latter, more universal concern about the possible contribution 
of the philosophy of religion to the global ethical discourse about the 
conditions of peaceful and solidary coexistence of people representing 
various metaphysical viewpoints, that prompts me to write this ‘reply’. 
Consequently, this paper is conceived as a critical but ultimately constructive 
reflection on how Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s hypothesis might be 
refined to be made relevant in a way they themselves might wish it to be, 
since arguably in its initial formulation it is unlikely to appeal to broader 
spectrum of adherents of the first-order religions. Accordingly, in addition 
to pointing out to what I  consider weak spots of Thornhill-Miller’s and 
Millican’s project, I  will outline an  alternative epistemological option of 
conceiving the nature and grounds of religious belief in a way that would 
accommodate their twin concern about the rationality of religious belief – 
especially vis-à-vis religious diversity, empirical psychological research 
concerning religious experience, and the non-availability of conclusive 
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evidence of ‘perceived supernatural agency’  – and with the challenge of 
religious diversity, while being a great deal less revisionist than their second-
order religion and showing that abandoning fundamental beliefs that are 
central to one’s first-order religious tradition is not a prerequisite of holding 
a rational religious belief under the condition of religious pluralism.
This, as I  will argue, can be achieved by attending to an  axiologically 
grounded religious belief that I refer to as ‘agatheism’ or ‘religion of the good’ 
(‘to agathon’ in Greek), since it identifies the Ultimate Reality religiously 
conceived with the ultimate good which is postulated as a  transcendental 
condition of our axiological consciousness through which we perceive 
and evaluate the goods at which our actions are aimed and towards which 
our hopes are directed.7 Agatheism conceives the Absolute as Agatheos8 by 
attributing to it first and foremost the characteristic of perfect goodness 
7 Speaking about the ‘ultimate good’ being postulated as a transcendental condition 
of our axiological consciousness I do not wish to imply that the epistemology of religious 
belief which I  presuppose is identical with that of Kant, and that agatheism rests on 
the Kantian postulates of practical reason. Agatheism does not presuppose Kantian 
transcendental idealism, as it is supposed to be compatible with variety of metaphysical 
outlooks. More importantly, speaking about agatheism being grounded in axiology, 
I do not imply that it is Kant’s ‘moral argument’ that provides the rational ground for 
agatheism. Unlike Kant, I do not presuppose that we need to postulate God’s existence 
in order to make sense of morality. On the contrary, I assume that there are a number of 
satisfactory ways to make sense of our moral obligations towards other sentient beings, 
without recourse to God. Agatheism answers a different set of questions than questions 
about the foundation of morality, namely questions about the ultimate meaning of our 
finite existence as perceived through the lenses of our axiological consciousness which 
directs our thoughts and hopes towards some ultimate good which does not seem to be 
realisable in the physical universe. Thus the fundamental intuition behind agatheism has 
more in common with Plato, than with Kant. For this reason, in this paper I avoid the use 
of terms like ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’, because the term ‘agathological’ – which is a subterm 
of ‘axiological’  – points more accurately in the direction of the concerns from which 
agatheistic religious belief arises, and diverts attention from misleading associations with 
the Kantian ‘moral argument’ for the existence of God.
8 The adjective ‘agathos’ is used to refer to God in the synoptic gospels in what may 
be considered to be a significant context. Encountering a ‘rich man’ who kneels before 
him and asks: “Good Teacher, what must I do to inherit eternal life?”, Jesus objects to 
being called good, explaining that “No one is good but God alone” (oudeis agathos ei me 
heis ho theos) – in Mark 10:18 and Luke 18:19 the wording is identical. Also, the ancient 
Greeks used the phrase ‘agathos theos’ to refer to divinity. In one noteworthy example, in 
the second book of the Republic, when addressing the question whether it is appropriate 
to ascribe to god or gods responsibility for evil in the world, Plato argues that “god is, of 
course, good in reality and should be spoken of as such” (agathos ho ge theos toi onti te 
kai lekteon houtos – 379a9-b1), and that being good, god is unable to do harm or to be 
the cause of evil.
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(but not necessarily all the other attributes of God of the Western classical 
theism, since ‘agatheism’ it is a ‘thinner’ concept than ‘theism’, capturing the 
agathological core of a broad range of religious concepts of the Absolute). 
Most importantly, agatheism ascribes to the Ultimate Reality9 the function 
of being the ultimate ground and ultimate end (telos) of all that is good, 
thus making sense of the teleological and value-laden nature of our self-
consciousness, of our thinking about our existence as of self-conscious, 
rational and free persons whose actions are explained by reference to 
value-laden reasons, not merely to efficient physical causes. Thus agatheistic 
religious belief is grounded primarily in the considerations of the ‘facts’ 
about our own value-laden self-consciousness, and only secondarily in the 
considerations of the facts about the physical universe. As such, it locates 
itself in the proximity of the line of thinking about the Absolute represented 
by Plato, Augustine, Kant and Newman, but some of its distinctive features 
are shaped by the new awareness of the significance of pluralism of religious 
beliefs and value systems as a major challenge to a peaceful and solidary 
human coexistence in the global age.
Arguably, agatheistic religious belief so conceived is explicitly or implicitly 
presupposed in most first-order religious traditions as their doxastic core. 
As I  will argue, such belief can be shown to be at least “not obviously 
unreasonable”, while it can in turn ground other, more specific, beliefs of 
a given religious tradition, making its belief system – if internally coherent 
- rationally grounded. The fact of diversity of religious belief systems will be 
explained by postulating that religion is a space of the exercise of agathological 
imagination, i.e., this dimension of the faculty of practical reason which is 
intentionally directed towards the ultimate good (of no choice of ours) and 
guides our mental activity leading to value judgments by imagining and 
comparing alternatives as more or less optimal, relative to our sense of the 
good as a transcendental limetic concept).10 Various religious belief systems 
9 Throughout the paper, I will treat the terms ‘the Ultimate Reality’ and ‘the Absolute’ 
as synonyms capturing in the most inclusive way the meaning of the Divine or highest 
reality that is the central focus of all religious traditions. Although the term ‘God’, reserved 
to capture the theistic conceptions of the Absolute, will also be used frequently, it is 
important to bear in mind that the conclusions of this paper are meant to be applicable 
as broadly as possible, to include all major religious traditions.
10 I take the concept of the ‘good’ to be a transcendental concept in the Kantian sense 
as a  form of our thought prior to experience of things which we perceive as having 
a property of goodness, and thus a concept that is primarily related to rational subject of 
perception, rather than intrinsically related to being. Following G. E. Moore, as well as the 
Medieval theorists of transcendentals, I take it to be a primitive, simple, first-known, and 
self-evident concept that cannot be analysed by taking recourse to a still higher genus. 
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are thus taken to be the expressions of various visions of what their adherents 
consider to be the optimal ways of conceiving human potentialities vis-à-vis 
the Ultimate Reality as the ultimate good towards which their existence is 
directed. To put it differently, on an agatheistic account of religion, various 
religious belief systems are products of human agathological imagination, 
which guided by the fundamental religious belief identifying the Absolute 
with the ultimate good, searches for the optimal conceptualisation of the 
nature of the Absolute and its relation to the world and humanity, attempting 
to approximate the human view of the matter to the ‘God’s eye view’. As 
such, agathological imagination, as an  imaginative dimension of reason, 
when active in the realm of religious belief, follows the logic of perfect being 
philosophy, especially the principle Deus semper melior  – ‘God is always 
better’ [than we can imagine], imagining what kind of God or the Ultimate 
Reality would be greater, in the sense of ‘more good’, and what kind of relation 
between such God and the world would be consistent with the nature of 
God so conceived. What can make such a mode of deliberation something 
more than a purely fideistic exercise in utopian thinking, is linking it to the 
question of the teleological character of our axiological consciousness that 
is always directed towards some ‘good’, towards ‘what ought to be’, towards 
something that always transcends the facts about the physical universe 
(‘what is’), and therefore cannot be explained by these facts alone, because 
it is not possible to derive values solely from the facts about the physical 
universe. Thus in order to make sense of the value-laden way we perceive 
reality as the world-for-us, and to give our existence some ultimate meaning, 
it may be necessary to postulate there being some ultimate good which is 
the ultimate source and the ultimate end of all that is good, and explains the 
teleological good-orientedness of our consciousness.
Needless to say, there will be various non-religious ways to conceive such 
‘ultimate good’, thus making sense of our axiological consciousness without 
postulating the existence of the Ultimate Reality religiously understood 
(perhaps along the lines of non-religious Platonism that is presupposed 
At the same time I take the concept of the ‘ultimate good’ to be a ‘limetic concept’ (from 
Latin limes - limit, frontier) by metaphorising the concept of a limes of a mathematical 
function as indicating a point towards which something tends in an asymptotic manner 
without ever reaching it. The concept of ‘God’ as ‘Agatheos’ is also a  limetic concept. 
I  stipulate that both in the case of the concept of the ‘ultimate good’ and the concept 
of ‘Agatheos’, the user of the concept presupposes that the reality to which the concept 
refers is only pointed to as the ultimate horizon that is of its nature unreachable for a 
human subject, although present as the background against which we perceive values 
that make their claim on us and are yet to be realised, as horizon is always ‘present’ when 
we perceive distant points on a trail that are yet to be reached.
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by some theoretical positions in the philosophy of mathematics, as well as 
in moral philosophy). Moreover, there is always a possibility of affirming 
the impossibility of ‘making sense’ of our value-laden perception of reality, 
opting, for example, for absurdism à la Camus. No doubt, various options 
may be articulated in an internally coherent way, and may be shown to be 
coherent with the facts about the physical universe established by science. 
The choice of an option how to make sense of our axiological consciousness 
will amount to a  choice of a  worldview. But since none of these options 
can be established conclusively as rationally superior, and yet considering 
various options in matters of such importance and taking a  stance may 
be a psychological necessity, as well as a condition of living an  ‘examined 
life’, choosing a religious option that identifies the ultimate good with the 
Absolute religiously conceived, may be as rational a choice as any. In any 
case agathological imagination will play a decisive role in choosing among 
the options, as well as among various religious conceptions of Agatheos as 
the source of ultimate meaning of human existence. Thus what we are left 
with is a range of ‘agathological landscapes’, conceived throughout human 
history by geniuses of agathological imagination, from philosophers and 
religious thinkers to poets and composers – agathological landscapes which 
we assess and choose between not for their aesthetic qualities, but for their 
goodness, goodness-for-us (agatheia).
In this paper I will argue that to the extent to which various first-order 
religious traditions have as its core agatheistic belief conceived in the way just 
outlined, they are in no way bound to be a breeding ground for irrationality 
or intergroup conflict. For this reason, agatheism may serve as a functional 
equivalent of Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s second-order religion, 
retaining its advantages, while avoiding its controversial aspects which 
may limit its appeal to adherents of first-order religious traditions. Unlike 
second-order religion, agatheism possesses conceptual resources to address 
the existential concerns that motivate and explain religious commitment – 
concerns pertaining to the realm of subjects, not of objects, the realm of the 
first-person, not the third-person perspective, the realm of ‘sense-making’ 
and ‘understanding’ by reference to reasons and goals, not of proof and 
scientific explanation by reference to efficient causes. Moreover, agatheism 
does not depend on the evidence of ‘perceived supernatural agency’, 
neither is it based solely or chiefly on the Fine-Tuning Argument (although 
teleology is central to its logic), therefore its rationality is not conditional 
on the results of the empirical research of physicists or neuroscientists. 
For this reason, agatheistic belief, unlike Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s 
second-order belief, can be unconditional, rather than provisional, which in 
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the case of a religious belief may turn out to be a psychological impossibility, 
since religious belief may require unconditional commitment.
Agatheism is grounded primarily in axiology, in the realm of values, not 
in the realm of facts about the physical universe, and therefore it cannot be 
conclusively confirmed or disconfirmed by scientific findings. Needless to 
say, in order to uphold its claim to rationality, religious belief as any belief 
worthy of respect has to be aligned with a worldview that is consistent with 
undisputed scientific findings, hence the importance of the philosophical 
work at the science/religion nexus, which, however, may only demonstrate 
the coherence of a religious worldview, not its veridicality, since of its nature 
no comprehensive worldview – whether religious or naturalistic – can be 
conclusively demonstrated to be true.
It is precisely this consideration, that religious belief grows out, as it 
were, of the ground of human values, of human concerns with ‘what ought 
to be’ or ‘what might be’, rather than solely with ‘what is’, which may provide 
a bridge between adherents of various worldviews, including atheists and 
theists, situating them epistemically on par. They are on par with regard 
to the rationality of their worldviews to the extent all worldviews contain 
a  central component that has an  axiological and teleological nature, and 
as such gives rise to questions regarding subjectively relevant meaning and 
conduct of human life which cannot be settled by natural science. However, 
such questions also cannot be left unanswered by adopting rigorously 
rational and consequently sceptical or agnostic attitude. As David Hume 
has conceded, to go on with our lives, and to make sense of our lives, we 
may have no option but to accept that the paradigm of objective rationality 
presupposed in formal sciences and natural sciences is not a  universally 
applicable guide to human thought and conduct, and that in the sphere 
of practical rationality we are bound at least to some degree to rely on 
our natural instincts and imagination. As Thornhill-Miller and Millican 
point out, Hume referred to such grounds of our beliefs and actions as 
“irrational” (p. 5), but he might have been wrong on this point, considering 
what contemporary proponents of externalist theories of knowledge and 
cognitive scientists have to say about the functioning of our cognitive 
faculties and about the degree to which our cognitive processes remain 
unconscious.11 It may turn out that what Hume refers to as ‘instinct’ or 
11 This is not to say that Hume was not a farseeing thinker who more than anybody 
before him was aware to what degree the functioning of our cognitive faculties is 
nontransparent to reason. What he seemed to fail to realise was  – to borrow Kant’s 
phraseology – that the denial of knowledge in some areas of human intellectual pursuit 
makes space not just for potential intrusion of irrationality, but also for ‘rational faith’ 
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‘imagination’, treating them as irrational, are in fact facets of the proper 
functioning of our complex cognitive faculties that ultimately aim at truth 
and thus are not irrational, despite the fact that we are not able to establish 
in an internalist fashion whether and to what degree the beliefs produced 
in such a way are warranted. Needless to say, we may need to admit that 
some such beliefs belong to the category of doxa, rather than episteme, to 
use Plato’s distinction, accepting that episteme is just not available in the 
realm of thought that is existentially relevant.
This admission that in the existentially relevant areas of the exercise of 
human reason adherents of various worldviews are epistemically on par 
should facilitate constructive philosophical engagement of atheists and 
theists conducted in the spirit of intellectual humility and rational self-
criticism. While not being able to yield ‘knowledge’ in accordance with 
the methodological criterions appropriate for studying physical objects 
and exploring an  objective point of view of a  given matter, agathological 
intuition and agathological imagination as capacities of human reason may 
be considered respectable sources of inter-subjectively communicable and 
justifiable beliefs expressing a  subjective point of view of the matter. As 
such, they may be conducive to contributing to the global ‘ethical discourse’ 
which – in the Habermasian sense of the term – focuses on the questions 
of the good life of individuals and groups cohabiting the same social space 
in the global age while having different life histories, traditions, and value 
systems, and being in need of finding a modus vivendi that would promote 
human flourishing of each and all individuals.
Presupposing such a ‘dialogical’ perspective, which Thornhill-Miller and 
Millican themselves encourage, I will grant them most of their empirically 
grounded arguments designed to challenge the evidential basis of the first-
order religions, while pointing to the axiological basis of religious belief 
which helps to shift the atheism/religion debate to the terrain where the 
partners of the dialogue can see themselves as epistemically on par. Thus 
I  will concur that the kind of evidence Thornhill-Miller and Millican are 
looking for in ‘empirical research’ and searching for proofs of ‘perceived 
supernatural agency’ may indeed be unavailable. But at the same time I will 
suggest that availability of evidence so understood is not presupposed by 
religious believers, because what is decisive from their subjective point of 
view is a kind of moral certainty, or – better to say – agathological certainty, 
understood not in religious terms, but as a  commitment to a  principle of hope that 
teleology which characterises our axiological consciousness is a  reliable guide for our 
sense-making activity without which human agency would be unintelligible, as already 
Plato has noticed.
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which – unlike empirical certainty concerning our knowledge of the facts 
about the physical universe – is grounded (and hence not groundless) in the 
realm of values.
Like moral beliefs, religious beliefs are formed in connection with 
thinking about human good, and in this sphere nothing more than 
agathological certainty, plus coherence of one’s worldview, may be expected 
and demanded. Agathological certainty as a  state of mind has a  certain 
phenomenal quality which is a  source of subjective reassurance, and can 
be captured by the adjective ‘agathonic’, created by conjunction of ‘agathon’ 
and ‘the tonic’ – a musical term referring to the central tone of a scale that 
is perceived subjectively by a listener as the point of ‘departure’ and ‘arrival’ 
of a  tonal musical narrative, and thus as a  kind of telos and the point of 
psychological rest. Thus the word ‘agathonic’, metaphorising the musical 
‘tonic’, takes on a meaning of ‘rest of the mind in the good’, or ‘rest of the 
mind in the confidence of reaching the good, realising the good, or being 
directed towards the good’.12 Certainty specific to religious beliefs, like 
certainty specific to moral beliefs, may be perceived subjectively and shared 
inter-subjectively, but cannot be turned into an  objective certainty, and 
therefore the search for such certainty – whether through the Fine-Tuning 
Argument or by reference to evidence of ‘perceived supernatural agency’ – is 
bound to be futile.
II. SECOND-ORDER RELIGION: DISPUTING THE NATURE 
AND GROUNDS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
As indicated in its title, Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s paper is above all 
devoted to outlining “the limits of rational religious belief ”, focusing on 
“perceived supernatural agency” as “the predominant evidential influence 
on religious belief ” (p. 2). As the discussion about the unavailability of the 
appropriate evidence proceeds, it becomes clear that it will be necessary 
to raise the question of the nature of religious belief that depends on the 
nature of the subject matter of belief, keeping in mind what Aristotle has 
observed in his Nicomachean Ethics: “It is the mark of an  educated man 
to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the 
12 This agathonic sense of ‘rest of the mind in the good’ that accompanies our mental 
states of certainty in the sphere of moral and agathological beliefs is analogical to the 
sense of ‘rest of the mind in truth’, which accompanies our states of certainty in the 
realm of beliefs about existentially irrelevant facts of the matter, but unlike in the case 
of certainty about factual beliefs and also aesthetic beliefs, certainty about moral and 
agathological beliefs carries with it a sense of fulfilled obligation and is specific to this 
category of beliefs.
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subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning 
from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.”13 
In a similar fashion one may argue that it may turn out to be unreasonable to 
demand irrefutable proofs and conclusive evidence in the realm of religious 
belief.
2.1. Grounds of religious belief: A priori considerations
To begin with, one can argue a priori against the availability of proofs or 
conclusive arguments regarding God’s existence, since the very concept of 
such proof or conclusive argument appears to be incoherent, as by definition 
God transcends human concepts, hence what is being grasped in human 
concepts which are applied to God cannot be God as God really is. Therefore 
theistic arguments may at most serve as ‘pointers’ (like the finger pointing 
at the moon in the oriental metaphor discussed by Thornhill-Miller and 
Millican, to which we will later return), or ‘paths’ (perhaps like Aquinas’ 
viae) that may direct human thought towards God, without ‘reaching’ God, 
because the concept of God itself – involving such qualifications as ‘perfect’ 
or ‘infinite’ – stipulates that God as God really is, is out of reach of the human 
mind. Only Divine mind can grasp God, thus arguing for the existence of 
the referent of a human concept of God, one cannot conclusively establish 
the existence of God.
Even more obviously, conclusive public empirical evidence of Divine 
agency is impossible, because there is no way one could deduce from 
finite effects the existence of an infinite Divine cause, while the conclusive 
evidence of the agency of finite ‘supernatural’ agents, even if available, 
would be useless from a theistic point of view, because from the existence of 
finite agents – whatever their nature – one cannot deduce conclusively the 
existence of a  theistic God. Thus the kinds of evidence that are discussed 
by Thornhill-Miller and Millican, such as “reported miracles, religious 
experiences, and other instances of perceived supernatural agency” (p. 2) are 
bound to constitute unsuccessful evidence, unless considered in connection 
with the pre-existing theistic belief, in which case it will be thought of as 
an  ‘evidence’ in an  entirely different sense, namely not as an  evidence of 
God’s existence or ability to act in the physical universe, but as a source of 
reassurance in a belief – e.g., in God’s providential care – already firmly held 
by a believer on a different ground.14
13 The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. by Jonathan 
Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), Book I, 1094.b24.
14 Since Thornhill-Miller and Millican devote much space to the discussion of the 
evidential value of reported miracles, it is important to keep in mind that extraordinary 
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Does it mean that the entire philosophical enterprise known under the 
heading of ‘arguments for the existence of God’ rests on a  mistake, and 
atheists waste their time attempting to refute them? It certainly does seem 
so, if terms like ‘proof ’ or ‘conclusive argument’ are used in this context, and 
are intended to mean something akin to how such terms are understood 
in ‘hard sciences’, where a proof or argument can be said to be conclusive 
when every person who is able to understand it will recognise it as such. 
However, it is likely that the pre-modern authors who – like Aquinas – are 
taken to be constructing arguments for the existence of God, do in fact seek 
to show coherence of the worldview of religious believers, that is to show 
that their religious beliefs do not contradict other well-established beliefs 
about the world and the place of humanity in it, which a reasonable person 
might be expected to hold. Such interpretation would be consistent with 
what seems to be implied in the phrase fides querens intellectum, which has 
been used by medieval philosophers to refer to this kind of employment of 
reason in the realm of religious thought. What we are having here is thus 
two very different kinds of reasoning about God: one which the critics of 
theistic arguments (and some of their apologetically inclined opponents) 
have in mind, and the other presupposed by the likes of Aquinas and 
employed implicitly by religious believers. The first one is a reasoning which 
starts with the facts about the world as explanandum and ends with God as 
explanans, without presupposing in the point of departure any particular 
concept of God. As I  have just pointed out, such argument can never be 
successful, because the facts about the universe are always such that it will 
suffice to posit a finite cause to explain them, therefore what will be posited 
as explanans, will always be less than God.
The second way of understanding what ‘theistic arguments’ are really 
about is that they aim at showing how beliefs about God – whose concept is 
presupposed, not argued for – can cohere with beliefs about the world. When 
forming the concept of God or the Ultimate Reality as perfect, infinite, 
etc., humans could not have relied solely on the reasoning that is aimed at 
explaining facts about the universe, but instead they had to rely primarily on 
events described in the ancient texts referred to as ‘miracles’ in modern times could not 
be conceived as playing the role of an  epistemic evidence that Hume and Thornhill-
Miller and Millican are disputing, because such events would be perceived against the 
background of an entirely different view of nature (with the existence of God or gods 
taken for granted, with no distinction between the ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ realm, 
and thus with the antecedent probability close to 1 that a miracle may happen), therefore 
it may be an  anachronism to ascribe to the biblical authors or other ancient authors 
an intention of pointing to ‘miracles’ as proving or providing evidence for the existence 
of God or gods.
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the reasoning aimed at explaining ‘facts’ about the way we think about the 
world and ourselves – as valuable, as bearer of values – and only secondarily 
on the reasoning aimed at explaining facts about the universe (secondarily, 
but necessarily, because without reference to the world we cannot form 
any concepts and think about anything, least about God). That this is what 
Aquinas is in fact doing in his Quinque Viae seems evident from the way he 
injects at the crucial stage of each ‘journey’ from the world to God, just before 
reaching the conclusion, a  formula: “and this is what we call God”,15 thus 
referring to a set of beliefs about the nature of God that is tacitly presupposed 
and must have an independent ground, because nothing in the preceding 
steps of each of his ‘arguments’ grounds a full-blown concept of a theistic 
God. Perhaps, in order to avoid confusion, and not to tempt atheistic critics 
to waste their time on showing that the ‘theistic arguments’ are inconclusive, 
it might be helpful to reformulate them all, so that they would begin with 
Aquinas’ formula: ‘Since this is what we call God  ...’, then moving to the 
facts about the world and arguing that God so conceived may play the role 
of the Unmoved Mover, the First Cause, the Designer of the universe, etc., 
and concluding that therefore the facts about the world do not contradict the 
possibility of the existence of God so conceived. Indeed, they show that the 
belief in God so conceived has certain explanatory potential, which explains 
why the human mind has a tendency to ‘travel’ these ‘five paths’ from the 
world to God so conceived, although such ‘journey’ is possible only because 
the concept of God is there in the mind of the ‘traveller’ at the beginning of 
the ‘journey’.
From the above discussion of the necessary inconclusiveness of theistic 
arguments and of the impossibility of successful empirical evidence of 
perceived Divine agency, there follows a number of consequences relevant 
to the assessment of Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s project. Firstly, in 
order not to be groundless and therefore irrational or non-rational in some 
fideistic fashion (which we do not advocate in this paper), religious belief 
has to have some ground, but neither theistic arguments, nor any public, 
empirical evidence one can think of, may ground a  belief in God or the 
Ultimate Reality religiously conceived and involving qualifications such as 
‘perfect’, ‘infinite’, etc.16
15 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province, trans., ed., and corrected by faculty and staff of the Aquinas Institute (Lander, 
Wyo.: The Aquinas Institute, 2012), Part I, q. 2, art. 3.
16 The tradition of scepticism about human ability to ascribe theistic attributes to 
the Absolute on the basis of our knowledge of the facts about the physical universe 
(rather than our awareness of our fundamental orientation towards the good) has a line 
of prominent exponents, from Plato, through Augustine, up to John Henry Newman 
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Secondly, the Fine-Tuning Argument cannot provide sufficient 
justification for religious belief any more than any other theistic argument. 
Whatever the verdict of future physics may turn out to be regarding the 
apparent ‘anthropic coincidences’, the Fine-Tuning Argument cannot 
ground belief in a theistic God, because an atheist will always have an option 
of positing that something else than God, that is, something less than God, 
may serve as explanans of the observed order of the universe. The most such 
an argument may establish is a belief in some Designer of the order of the 
universe, but not the creator in the sense of the ultimate source of all being 
and value, a  perfectly good and holy God worthy of worship,17 who can 
serve as the ultimate anchor of human hope.18
Therefore, thirdly, the only way to ground specifically theistic or 
agatheistic religious belief, a belief in God or the Ultimate Reality endowed 
with moral or  – better to say  – agathological attributes,19 is by reasoning 
from human axiological consciousness to God as the ultimate good, towards 
which human axiological consciousness is ultimately directed.
However, fourthly, once a  belief in God as the ultimate good is so 
grounded, there is a  possibility of a  ‘justificatory descent’, so that, for 
example, belief in God being the ultimate source of all that exists, or belief in 
God ‘revealing’ himself to (some) rational creatures, may now be grounded 
in the foundational belief in God being perfectly good and being the 
who famously stated: “Were it not for this voice, speaking so clearly in my conscience 
and my heart, I should be an atheist, or a pantheist, or a polytheist when I looked into 
the world.” (J. H. Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 
1908), p. 241.)
17 Actually, the Demiurge of Plato’s Timaeus that may serve as an  example of 
such a  postulated explanans of the order of the physical universe is considered to be 
a malevolent, rather than benevolent being. Similarly, Hindu cosmologies do not ascribe 
to the gods responsible for ‘shaping’ of the material world the attributes of the Ultimate 
Reality.
18 Interestingly, Thornhill-Miller and Millican are aware of this inability of the Fine-
Tuning Argument to point towards morally perfect designer of the universe (cf. footnote 
144 on p. 47), yet they stop short of recognising that this limitation is in fact fatal to 
their project, given that they identified it as the only rational basis of their second-order 
religion.
19 Speaking about ‘moral’ attributes of God may be problematic, given that the 
term ‘moral’ is usually associated with ‘moral obligations’, while attributing to God any 
‘obligations’ which God would need to fulfil to be ‘moral’ may be incoherent. We usually 
apply the term ‘moral’ to God when speaking about God’s attributes which are related 
to creatures, namely about the ways God may be good-for-us. Thus it seems that in this 
context the use of the term ‘agathological’ is preferable to ‘moral’, because the former 
does not carry with it the sense of ‘moral obligation’.
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ultimate good, which makes it reasonable to believe that God so conceived 
might be expected to be in such and such relation to the world and humanity. 
Thus the doxastic structure of an agatheistic religious belief system that is 
grounded in axiology can be metaphorically envisaged as a ladder, but with 
descending, not ascending order of justificatory dependence, and the ladder 
hangs, as it were, from the ‘ceiling’ of the belief in God being perfectly good 
and being the ultimate good. On this picture, religious beliefs of increasing 
particularity will draw their justification from the higher-level beliefs, being 
perceived as more or less rational against the background of antecedent 
probability of something being the case, given that we have accepted the 
higher-level belief as true. Thus we may speak about antecedent probability 
of Divine self-revelation or religious experience, relative to the higher-level 
belief in perfect goodness of God, which will play the role of the justificatory 
basis of particular beliefs grounded in one’s religious experience or in one’s 
encounter with what one considers to be a case of Divine revelation. The 
key point is that such beliefs without the basis in antecedent probability of 
the relevant higher-level beliefs could not be justified solely by reference to 
the experience that grounds it. Hence, particular religious experience may 
constitute a ground of beliefs formed on its basis, but both subjective certainty 
regarding the veridicality of the beliefs grounded in such experience and 
inter-subjective justification of such beliefs are dependent on the antecedent 
probability of the higher-level beliefs, and without holding these higher-level 
beliefs a religious experience could not be even recognised as such by the 
subject of the experience. What will be important to bear in mind accepting 
such a vision of the epistemology of religious belief, with the principle of 
justificatory descent as its centrepiece, is that if the entire agatheistic doxastic 
practice depends for its justification on the belief in God being perfectly 
good and being the ultimate good, then any religious belief that will stand in 
clear contradiction to these assumptions regarding the nature of God – and 
to any consequences that may be drawn from this foundational agatheistic 
belief – will rightly be considered as positively irrational.20
20 In this vein, I have argued elsewhere that a belief in ‘Divine favouritism’, whether 
it comes to an exclusivist view of the truth about the Ultimate Reality being available to 
adherents of only one religious tradition, or to an interventionist vision of God changing 
the natural course of events to assist some creatures more than others in their realisation 
of their creaturely potential, is inconsistent with the logic of perfect being philosophy 
that underlies the exercise of agathological imagination, and makes a  religious belief 
system that includes such beliefs internally incoherent. (Cf. Janusz Salamon, “Theodicy 
of Justice as Fairness and Sceptical Pluralism”, in S.T. Kolodziejczyk and Janusz Salamon 
(eds.), Knowledge, Action, Pluralism (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Press, 2013), 
pp. 249-280.)
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Fifthly, as is entailed in what was said above, acknowledgment that no 
experience or event in the physical universe may serve as conclusive evidence 
of the existence of God, or of perceived Divine agency, does not imply 
a denial that religious experience – understood in terms of various modes 
of awareness of the Divine presence – does play a central role in religious life 
understood as a spiritual journey towards God which consists in realisation 
of values that have its source and fullness in God. In such a  connection, 
instances when a religious believer forms a belief that she has experienced 
God as being present to her do not play a role of ‘evidence’ of God’s existence 
that would give rise to a belief in God’s existence that was not there. Instead, 
such experiences typically occur in the context of a  process of spiritual 
development or metanoetic transformation (the Greek noun ‘metanoia’  – 
signifying a change of mind – in the biblical vocabulary acquires more specific 
meaning of ‘conversion’ as turning towards God). In such a context, religious 
experiences have spiritual progress rather than epistemic certainty for their 
purpose, therefore they presuppose and probe faith and trust in God, rather 
than allowing one to turn God into an object of experience which might be 
‘objectified’ or ‘pinned down’ to ensure a degree of epistemic certainty on the 
part of the subject of experience. If any conclusion regarding the evidential 
value of religious experience can be drawn from philosophical analysis of 
the mystical literature, it is that the ‘object’ of religious experience tends to 
evaporate, as it were, when approached as an object, in an objectifying way, 
rather than as what it is supposed to be, namely a  subject par excellence: 
a  supremely free Absolute Mind, transcending infinitely the limitations of 
human mind. Even in the case of the human inter-personal encounters, it is 
not possible to fully objectify the subjectivity of the other, and speaking about 
religious experience we are faced with epistemological riddles similar to those 
associated with ‘experiencing other person’, except that when the ‘object’ of 
the experience is supposed to be the subjectivity of God, the challenge is 
infinitely magnified by what we stipulate about the nature of God.
Accordingly, in most religious traditions  – even when the Ultimate 
Reality is not conceived as a person – mystical encounter with the Ultimate 
Reality is usually conceived in terms of free gift of self-disclosure on the part 
of God, not something that can be ‘achieved’ by human effort, and this is not 
contradicted by the existence of mystical ‘traditions’. Such traditions do not 
presuppose some kind of ‘objective availability’ of God to be experienced 
under clearly specified conditions, and do not teach how to ‘achieve’ the 
experience of God by following some esoteric manual, but instead advise 
the adept how to remove the obstacles to encounter with God – obstacles 
consisting in inappropriate ‘objectifying’ and ‘possessive’ attitude towards 
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God. Thus, while being in principle sympathetic to Thornhill-Miller’s 
and Millican’s proposal “to embrace the universality of these [religious] 
experiences, interpreting them as pointing toward the divine in a way that is 
accessible to those of all faiths” (p. 19), I would need to point out the a priori 
and a  posteriori considerations which must qualify this “universality” as 
implying possibility of ‘authentic’ religious experience taking place in the 
context of “all faiths”, but not some kind of ‘general accessibility’.
Taking it all into account, one can conceive of religious experience in 
a way that is consistent with the agatheistic concept of God or the Ultimate 
Reality as the ultimate good, namely as an  intellectual perception, by 
a subject that conceives of God or the Ultimate Reality as supremely good, of 
the presence of a reality apprehended by the subject as exceedingly good and 
identified by the subject as God or the Ultimate Reality. There is no place 
here to engage in a discussion about the causal part of the story of the subject 
of religious experience forming such a belief, but it goes without saying that 
such experience cannot serve as a public and conclusive evidence of God’s 
existence or agency. However, from the point of view of the subject of such 
experience, a belief formed on its basis may be rational to the extent it is 
supported by the higher-order belief in God as the ultimate good that might 
be expected to make his presence felt to a believer who “seeks his face”, to 
use a biblical expression (Psalm 24). As in the case of every experience, its 
subject forms on its basis beliefs characterised by subjective certainty, but in 
the case of religious experience it will be the kind of agathological certainty 
defined above, underpinned by agathonic feeling of ‘rest in the good’, which 
reassures the subject in his confidence in the authenticity of an experience 
precisely because of its positive content. As is clear from countless reports 
of such experiences, the ‘object’ of such experience presents itself to the 
subject as exceedingly good, but to make any sense of such ‘experience’, one 
has to presuppose that the subject has a particular concept of God or the 
Ultimate Reality before having an experience of its presence. This principle 
applies to any experiential data that may be taken to be a manifestation of 
God’s existence or action in the world, which reinforces our conclusion that 
theistic religious belief cannot be based solely on a theistic argument that 
starts with the facts about the physical universe, as does the Fine-Tuning 
Argument on which Thornhill-Miller and Millican want to base their 
second-order religious belief.
2.2. Grounds of religious belief: A posteriori considerations
So far we dwelt chiefly on the a priori considerations, related to the nature 
of God as stipulated by religious believers, relevant to the assessment of 
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Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s critique of the rationality of first-order 
religious belief that presupposes that the classic theistic arguments on 
one hand, and religious experience and miracles on the other, exhaust 
the list of possible sources of rationality of religious belief. However, 
there is another set of considerations, this time a posteriori, related to 
the nature of religious belief as fulfilling certain functions in the life of 
a typical religious believer, and thus explaining why such a believer holds 
any religious beliefs at all, whether rational or not. These considerations 
will be relevant especially to the assessment of the positive aspect of 
Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s project, namely their hypothetical 
second-order religion. Both sets of considerations will be decisive for 
putting forward agatheism as a  functional equivalent of second-order 
religion, suggesting that agatheism scores better on all counts.
My critique of Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s hypothesis boils down 
to a worry that their concern with the emancipation of religious believers 
from irrationality leads them to adopt a paradigm of objective rationality 
appropriate for natural sciences that considers only the factors that are 
objectively verifiable, while ignoring or explaining away what following 
Thomas Nagel we might call ‘the subjective point of view of a subject matter’. 
As a result they end up throwing the proverbial baby out with a bathwater 
and hypothesise a form of religious belief that arguably lacks what is religious 
in religion.
What is at stake here is not some purely academic definitional 
disagreement (what we are supposed to mean by ‘religion’), but something 
absolutely central to Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s project, given that 
they start with admission that the ‘secularization hypothesis’ appears 
to be wrong (“as religious influence reasserts itself around the world”), 
then delve into psychological research, which supposedly “discovers why 
supernatural thinking is so intuitive and so hard to eliminate even when 
the effort is made” (p. 44), and finally proceed to propose a more rational 
replacement to the actual forms of religious belief to which people adhere 
to. Thus in the heart of this enterprise lies the question: what makes people 
adhere to religious beliefs in the first place, despite their growing awareness 
that natural sciences explain the facts about the physical universe without 
reference to supernatural powers?
Unsurprisingly, psychological research, which Thornhill-Miller and 
Millican bring to bear on their discussion of the above question, effectively 
explains away what religious scholars and believers themselves might 
consider to be specifically religious elements in religion, by reducing the 
reasons why people become or stay religious to “various practical benefits 
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of religion to the individual – social support, sense of meaning and security, 
comfort in times of grief, prayer-placebo”. Taking into account that such 
“benefits” of religious belief might perhaps “equally well be delivered by 
non-supernatural means (e.g. non-religious group membership and forms 
of meditation, psychotherapy, etc.)”, Thornhill-Miller and Millican are 
nevertheless inclined to think that “the very naturalness of religion gives 
some reason to doubt its easy replaceability, historically immersed as we 
are in well-established religious traditions whose rituals have evolved to fit 
human needs” (p.  45). It is the way they define these “human needs”, the 
satisfaction of which is supposed to explain the existence of religion, that 
is perhaps the most disputable aspect of their work, while being of crucial 
importance, because it shapes their view of the character and nature of 
religious belief, which in turn colours their second-order religion. It is my 
contention that Thornhill-Miller and Millican overlook or downplay the 
importance of a  number of fundamental aspects of religious belief, such 
as (a) its soteriological/eschatological perspective presupposing some 
formulation of “what can I hope”, to use Kant’s phrase; (b) its metanoetic/
transformational function presupposing some paradigm of spirituality 
which goes beyond the search for “sense of security” and “comfort in 
times of grief ”; and (c) its relational/inter-subjective character associated 
with religious attitude of worship and love, and presupposing freedom of 
assent. By ignoring these central dimensions of religion, they make both 
their discussion of the limits of rational religious belief and the plausibility 
of their second-order religion hypothesis open to dispute.
Before discussing the importance of the fundamental aspects of religious 
belief enumerated above to the assessment of second-order religious belief, 
and of agatheistic belief as its possible contender, let me draw attention to 
a startling fact that to the extent second-order religion is based solely on the 
Fine-Tuning Argument and detached from first-order religious traditions, 
it is hard to see how it could deliver even these narrowly defined “practical 
benefits”, like “social support, sense of meaning and security, comfort in 
times of grief, prayer-placebo”, which our authors identify as the probable 
motivation that explains religious commitment. Thus there seems to be 
an  internal tension between what the authors themselves identify as the 
human needs that religion is supposed to satisfy and their articulation of their 
second-order religion which they put forward as a satisfactory replacement 
of the existing religions, while it is clear that these needs cannot be met by 
second-order religion so conceived (and things will get worse when we will 
agree that religious belief typically satisfies also other important “human 
needs” which Thornhill-Miller and Millican do not take into account).
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The reasons why second-order religion cannot satisfy such existential 
needs have to do with the inability of the Fine-Tuning Argument to establish 
a belief in God or the Ultimate Reality that might satisfy them. The authors do 
not make it clear what particular religious beliefs the Fine-Tuning Argument 
is supposed to justify, but it is clear what kind of beliefs cannot be justified 
by it. The older versions of the Teleological Argument were supposed to lend 
its support to belief in the existence of a Designer accounting for the total 
order of the universe, therefore arguing from the effect to the cause, one 
might have been able to ‘learn’ a lot about the Designer of the universe as the 
cause of its order. But precisely for this reason, it was possible to question the 
Teleological Argument by pointing to the elements of apparent disorder in 
the universe (as did Hume), or to the inability of the human mind to grasp 
the architecture of the universe in its totality in such a way as to be able to 
affirm the order that would call for explanation by reference to a rational 
Designer (as did Kant). Moreover, both Hume and Kant have argued that 
even if it would be possible to affirm the order of the universe that would 
point to a Designer, it would be problematic to ascribe to that Designer the 
typical theistic attributes, and perfection in general. The universe is not 
perfect, so its Designer does not have to be perfect, and the existence of 
evil makes it less than obvious that the Designer of the world in which we 
live must be perfectly good. The Fine-Tuning Argument differs from the 
earlier versions of the Teleological Argument in that it specifies in a more 
precise and scientifically verifiable way the elements of the order that call for 
explanation (namely certain ‘anthropic coincidences’ in the laws of physics 
without which higher life forms could not develop), however it retains the 
other limitations of the Teleological Argument which prevents one from 
concluding that the Designer responsible for setting the physical constants 
needs to be the perfect and omnibenevolent God of theism.
Quite apart from the unsuitability of the Fine-Tuning Argument as 
a candidate for the sole foundation of a religious belief system having to do 
with its provisional nature (since future physics can always explain this or 
that physical constant undermining ‘supernatural’ significance of all other 
‘anthropic coincidences’), the argument does not show that the Designer of 
the universe may be concerned specifically with the human species. For this 
reason Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s following interpretation of what 
the Fine-Tuning Argument implies – an interpretation on which the entire 
argument of the paper appears to rest – seems problematic in more than 
one way. They write: “If the universe has in fact been finely tuned to be 
especially conducive to the evolution of higher life forms with moral and 
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religious sensitivities, then it is only to be expected that such life forms will 
proliferate across the multitude of galaxies we observe, and that religion will 
evolve in many different ways, yielding a wide variety of specific religious 
systems” (p. 4). Firstly, the above sentence appears to imply that the authors 
take it for granted that fine-tuning entails that what explains the fine-tuning, 
explains also the evolution of the species, but this is surely reading into fine-
tuning more than the apparent discovery of the physical constants which 
are ‘life-friendly’ justifies. But let’s presume that it is reasonable to make the 
connection between fine-tuning and the evolution of the species, perhaps 
by suggesting that once we have granted that the postulated Designer of the 
universe is in some sense rational, we may reason that it would be pointless 
to fine-tune the universe to make it hospitable for life, without setting the 
conditions for evolution of the higher forms of life. It will still be far from 
obvious, why the Designer in question would aim at the evolution of the life 
forms with “moral and religious sensitivities”. Most importantly, even if one 
would grant Thornhill-Miller and Millican that the Fine-Tuning Argument 
establishes rationality of belief in the Designer’s special concern for the 
development of rational creatures like human beings, nothing would follow 
when it comes to the question whether the Designer of the finely-tuned 
universe is concerned about Jones’ or Smith’s existence. Thornhill-Miller’s 
and Millican’s comment about proliferation of higher life forms across the 
universe, their evolution “in many different ways”, and development of 
a wide variety of religious systems suggests strongly that they presuppose 
that the Designer set certain initial conditions that make the evolutionary 
processes leading to the development of higher life forms possible, but the 
entire process is random, therefore there is no point in talking about the 
Designer being ‘providentially’ concerned with this or that form of the 
higher life form (like humanity), not mentioning Jones or Smith.
How against this background one is to understand the suggestion that 
part of the design manifested in fine-tuning is to make all these higher life 
forms evolving in many different ways end up with “moral and religious 
sensitivities” is a mind-boggling question. One is tempted to suspect that 
what is happening here is Thornhill-Miller and Millican realising that it is 
hard to make the logical connection between the existence of the Designer 
of the finely-tuned universe and the existence of “religious sensitivities” in 
humans, and salvaging the situation by bringing through the back door the 
more expansive old version of Teleological Argument, in which the Designer 
is supposed to explain all important features of the universe.
One’s suspicions that this is indeed the case grows when towards the 
end of the paper, at the culminating point of their presentation of the 
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virtues of second-order religion, Thornhill-Miller and Millican appeal to 
‘religious instincts’ (presumably synonymous with ‘religious sensitivities’ 
just mentioned), and apparently intend to make much out of this purported 
instinctual religious faculty, while it is not clear how this faculty fits in 
a  coherent way a  broader picture of the epistemology of religious belief 
which the authors seem to presuppose throughout the paper. As if realising 
how limited in content second-order religious belief based solely on the 
Fine-Tuning Argument is likely to be, and therefore it needs to be somehow 
supplanted, they propose “to abandon the competing dogmatisms of first-
order supernaturalism and instead fall back onto an  undogmatic version 
of its second-order cousin, finding intimations of divinity in the general 
structures of the world and in our own religious instincts, while remaining 
fully committed to the enterprise of natural science” (p. 46).
Now, there are at least two ways how ‘religious instinct’ may be 
understood in the context of Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s project, both 
of which are problematic. A  rigorous interpretation of ‘religious instinct’ 
is likely to be theologically impotent, while an  unrigorous interpretation 
is likely to cause a theological flood which our authors may wish to resist. 
Thus, either ‘religious instinct’ is conceived here in the way that finds 
support in the Fine-Turning Argument itself, in which case it cannot imply 
more than instinctual tendency to recognise the existence of the Designer 
about whom there is no reason to believe anything else than that ‘he’ set 
the physical constants in a  way that is conducive to the development of 
higher-life forms, in which case it is hard to see what kind of “intimations 
of divinity” might be found by appeal to such instinctual faculty. Or else 
‘religious instinct’ can mean as much as is implied in Calvin’s concept of 
sensus divinitatis employed by Alvin Plantinga in his influential externalist 
and anti-evidentialist Reformed epistemology. Sensus divinitatis, a kind of 
sixth sense, ‘religious sense’, is indeed a  form of ‘religious instinct’ and is 
understood to be a part of the design of our cognitive faculties by God the 
Creator, and is universal, and thus in a certain sense ‘natural’, independent 
of tradition-specific religious revelation, hence it might play the role of 
‘religious instinct’ that Thornhill-Miller and Millican postulate. But the 
way sensus divinitatis is understood in Reformed epistemology shows that 
‘religious instinct’ does not have to be conceived in a minimalist way that 
could be justified by the Fine-Tuning Argument. On the contrary, this 
instinctual faculty is taken to be a belief forming mechanism which – using 
Plantinga’s terminology – when functioning properly and in an appropriate 
environment confers warrant on all sorts of particular religious beliefs 
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giving them a status of warranted beliefs.21 Needless to say, adherents of wide 
variety of theistic religious traditions might in a similar way claim warrant 
by thinking about their religious beliefs as being formed by this instinctual 
belief forming mechanism, in which case we are back with plurality of full-
blown first-order traditions, the rationality of which Thornhill-Miller and 
Millican deny.
No less controversial is the suggestion that we may find “intimations 
of divinity in the general structures of the world”, given that on its own, 
the Fine-Tuning Argument does not prove that the Designer of the finely-
tuned universe must be conceived as ‘divine’, and stipulating the concept 
of ‘divinity’ in a way that would allow for such a move would have to be 
justified on a ground independent of the Fine-Tuning Argument.
By now it should be clear how much depends on which of two ways 
of approaching the issue of fine-tuning  – rigorous or unrigorous  – will 
Thornhill-Miller and Millican adopt. They may choose to construe the Fine-
Tuning Argument in a rigorous manner, but then it will entail at most the 
existence of a Designer who ordered the universe in a way that is conducive 
to the existence of life in it (needless to say, ‘he’ does not have to be the 
universe’s creator, and even less so a creator ex nihilo). Such a conclusion 
might perhaps be a  source of confidence in the general teleology of the 
physical universe and thus may reassure those who find it difficult to accept 
that the universe is an outcome of some unintended nexus of physical causes. 
However, there is little reason why it should be taken to justify a confidence 
in the Designer intentionally bringing about the existence of creatures with 
“religious sensitivities”, and no reason to believe in the Designer’s providence 
in safeguarding the well-being of any particular life forms, or individuals.
The alternative approach to fine-tuning may be to argue that fine-tuning 
justifies going back to the full-blown Teleological Argument which treats 
God – whose concept is drawn from a different source than the Teleological 
Argument itself  – as explanans of all sorts of phenomena which appear 
to have teleological characteristics, including the existence of “moral and 
religious sensitivities” and everything that the existence of such sensitivities 
might imply. Such an option is available, but only to those who wish to accept 
the epistemology of religious belief I have recommended above, involving 
the principle of justificatory descent, since now someone who already has 
a concept of a theistic or agatheistic God grounded in axiology, confronted 
with the alleged ‘anthropic coincidences’ will be able to form a belief that 
the conclusions of the Fine-Tuning Argument, when read against the 
21 Cf. Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), pp. 148ff.
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background of the higher-order theistic beliefs make sense, because their 
antecedent probability relative to the higher-order beliefs makes them, as 
well as the conclusions of the more expansive version of the Teleological 
Argument, reasonable. That would be an example of unrigorous approach 
to fine-tuning, which leads to drawing conclusions which are not entailed in 
the Fine-Tuning Argument standing on its own.
It seems that Thornhill-Miller and Millican intend to approach fine-
tuning in the rigorous way, but realising that their second-order religious 
belief is empty of content, or nearly so, they find themselves under pressure 
to base their second-order religion on the old-style expansive Teleological 
Argument, rather than on the modern Fine-Tuning Argument rigorously 
interpreted. However, Thornhill-Miller and Millican have good reasons to 
resist this kind of unrigorous approach to teleology, because it is precisely 
this line of reasoning which in response to the question: ‘what was God’s 
telos in creating the universe and human beings’, generates the entire first-
order theistic religious traditions (relying in the process on agathological 
imagination). After all, once we have granted that the Designer of the 
universe transcends nature, and the Designer is responsible for all important 
features of the universe, why not presuppose that the ultimate telos of the 
creation transcends nature? If God the Designer is responsible for the 
existence of “higher life forms with moral and religious sensitivities”, which 
direct their thoughts and hopes towards God or the Ultimate Reality that 
transcends nature, what is unusual in presupposing not just a  particular 
teleological vision of history involving the ‘communication’ of God with 
his creatures, but also a  particular eschatology, a  vision of the end-state, 
that transcends nature? One might presume that faced with the question: 
what is the telos of the existence of these “higher life forms with moral and 
religious sensitivities”, Thornhill-Miller and Millican might wish to answer 
as Aristotle would: flourishing life within the bounds of nature. But in 
such a case, why would the Designer of the universe bother to endow such 
creatures with “religious sensitivity” that tends to direct their thoughts and 
hopes beyond the bounds of the natural and beyond death?
Thus, if one adopts an  unrigorous approach to fine-tuning allowing 
ourselves to discern teleology in various spheres of reality (rather than 
limiting oneself to the list of ‘anthropic coincidences’), one risks opening the 
doors to a theological flood that results in a multiplicity of first-order religious 
traditions that may actually be conceived as alternative detailed responses to 
the question about the ultimate telos of all that exists, and this is an outcome 
that Thornhill-Miller and Millican want us to avoid. And yet, were they to 
stick to the rigorous interpretation of fine-tuning, they would be unable to 
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explain how a  religious belief based solely on the Fine-Tuning Argument 
may be a source of the alleged “practical benefits” of religious belief to the 
individual, such as “social support, sense of meaning and security, comfort in 
times of grief, prayer-placebo” (p. 45). If there is no reason to believe that the 
Designer of the finely-tuned universe ought to stretch out ‘his’ providential 
care over humanity at large and even less so over individual human beings, 
how might accepting (provisionally) the hypothesis that fine-tuning points 
to some Designer responsible for setting certain physical constants cause 
one feel “comforted in times of grief ” or have a  “sense of security”? And 
what reason might the Fine-Tuning Argument give one to think that it 
might make sense to pray to such a Designer of the finely-tuned universe? 
As to possible “social support” as a “practical benefit” of religious belief, it 
is hard to think what might bind together adherents of such second-order 
religion to create a  religious community that might provide its members 
with “social support” that could not be easily replaced by social support of 
non-religious kind. One may safely presume that the “social support” found 
by religious believers in the context of their religious communities has some 
specifically religious component, such as companionship on the path of 
religious growth defined against the background of some shared spiritual 
and soteriological vision.
It is a pity that the phrase “sense of meaning” that appears on Thornhill-
Miller’s and Millican’s list of the alleged “benefits” of religious belief has been 
left by the authors without any comment that might give us a clue what it is 
supposed to imply. On the agatheistic picture of religious belief, satisfying 
our human need for making sense of our first-person, irreducibly subjective 
point of view on existentially relevant aspects of the world is – next to the 
need of making sense of our axiological consciousness – one of the main 
motives which give rise to religious belief. However, if Thornhill-Miller and 
Millican would stick to the rigorous interpretation of fine-tuning, it is hard 
to see how their second-order religious belief might be an abundant source 
of existentially relevant “meaning”.
Perhaps the first sphere of meaning which comes to mind in connection 
with religion is giving each individual existence an  ultimate meaning 
despite vast majority of lives lived in the course of human history having 
all appearances of abject failure, of good being defeated, of hope being 
denied. For this reason, all post-Axial religious traditions, even the 
ones which lack a  God-figure, presuppose some possibility of ultimate 
fulfilment of human potential by way of transcending the limitations and 
contingency of our present condition. Whether conceptualised in terms of 
salvation, redemption, liberation, or in some other way, this soteriological 
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and eschatological promise is usually associated with the possibility of 
achievement of some kind of unity with the Ultimate Reality. Now, it is hard 
to see what second-order religion might have to offer by way of offsetting 
the disappointment most people experience at the gulf between ‘what is’ and 
‘what ought to be’ or ‘what might be’, given Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s 
radically apophatic, almost agnostic, portrayal of the “luminous, second-
order ultimate reality of some kind that yet lies beyond the comprehension 
of all our individual efforts to point to it” (p. 49). Surely, learning that the 
universe is purposely finely tuned to make the existence of higher life forms 
possible does not – on its own – sound like sufficiently good news for the 
inhabitants of the planet, the majority of whom had no chance to reach 
maturity, and of those who had, only few had a chance to lead a life to which 
the term eudaimonia conceived in an Aristotelian fashion could be applied 
with any degree of plausibility, in which case they might perhaps have good 
reason to perceive their life as meaningful enough and not to hope for more.
All in all, a second-order religious belief based solely on the Fine-Tuning 
Argument – which might justify its claim to objective, scientific rationality – 
can hardly be a  religious belief, rather than a  purely metaphysical or 
cosmological belief that does not involve religious attitudes of worship and 
orientation of one’s existence towards God or the Ultimate Reality as its 
ultimate telos. Such second-order religion cannot provide an  appropriate 
context for “intimations of divinity” (unless we conceive ‘religious instinct’ 
or ‘religious sensitivity’ in an expansive way unwarranted by the Fine-Tuning 
Argument). For this reason, it also cannot serve as a source of existentially 
relevant “sense of meaning”, neither can it deliver any other “practical 
benefits”, such as “comfort in times of grief ”.
III. THE EXISTENTIAL IRRELEVANCE OF SECOND-ORDER RELIGION
At this stage one might pause and ask oneself: how Branden Thornhill-Miller 
and Peter Millican might have arrived at such an extraordinary conception 
of second-order religious belief? My first reaction to their hypothesis was 
that of an awe how close it is to Hume’s spirit. I thought that Hume would 
approve of all the conclusions of the paper, including the rejection of his 
own maxim on miracles. But then I have changed my mind and concluded 
that since Hume has admitted that he does not expect the majority of people 
to abandon their religious beliefs and practices, and since he accepted 
that ‘human nature’ itself leaves us no choice but to rely on instinct and 
imagination as providing context for or complementing the exercise of pure 
reason, would he choose to join Thornhill-Miller and Millican in their effort 
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to articulate a sensible epistemology of religious belief, he would most likely 
give up any hope that religious belief may ever be justified in a rational way, 
and would not try to base it on the Fine-Tuning Argument or any other 
argument or empirical evidence. Instead, recognising that the secularisation 
thesis might be false, Hume would probably presuppose the existence of 
something like ‘religious instinct’, and then would simply allow religious 
believers to follow their religious instinct without expecting them to be 
able to rationally justify their particular religious beliefs (perhaps adding, 
as he should, that a religious believer, like every other reasonable person, 
is under rational obligation of ensuring coherence of his religious beliefs 
with his other well-established beliefs about the world). In other words, if 
Hume would have to grant that religious belief is in some sense natural, he 
would conceive of the epistemology of religious belief along fideistic lines, 
perhaps accepting Plantinga’s externalist epistemology of religious belief, 
which under the condition of religious diversity may be considered to be 
a form of epistemologically sophisticated fideism. Allowing for that, Hume 
would probably see no reason why religious believers would have to stick to 
rigorously apophatic or agnostic approach to the Ultimate Reality, if religious 
instincts lead them to attribute to it certain particular characteristics, or to 
believe in a particular vision of relation between the Ultimate Reality to the 
world and humanity. After all, Hume will not expect any of these beliefs be 
justified in any other way than by reference to the religious instinct. Hume 
might also be aware that ‘religious instinct’ and ‘religious imagination’ play 
a pragmatic role in the religious sphere, analogical to that played by instinct 
and imagination in our interaction with the world and other people, so that 
relying on them and thus being religious is likely to involve not just ‘believing 
in something’ (holding certain beliefs), but ‘doing something’, ‘adopting 
certain attitude towards God’ (‘believing God’ vs. ‘believing in God’), also 
‘undergoing something’ (undergoing spiritual/metanoetic transformation), 
and ‘hoping for something’. And to be able to do all that, believers have to 
hold some particular religious beliefs, perhaps many of them.
Thus, at the end Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s idea of second-order 
religious belief may not appear to be as Humean as one might expect 
it to be. If anything, it reminds one of Aristotle’s vision of the Unmoved 
Mover putting the universe in motion. Aristotle may be able to say about 
his Absolute (as a  ‘thought thinking itself ’) more than Thornhill-Miller 
and Millican about their Designer of the finely-tuned universe, but this 
is so because part of what he says about the Unmoved Mover is based on 
a perfect being philosophy type of reasoning, not on abductive reasoning 
or inference to the best explanation which starts with the facts about the 
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physical universe and postulates the existence of the Unmoved Mover. 
Aristotle’s vision of the Absolute is a product of his agatological imagination. 
He thinks that an  Absolute is a  thought thinking itself, not interested in 
the universe, because his agatological imagination tells him that this is the 
optimal mode of existence.
Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s view of the “luminous second-order 
ultimate reality” shares some of the rational purity of Aristotle’s vision, 
which does not require ‘faith’, but allows for full ‘objectification’ of our 
knowledge of the Absolute. Since the Aristotelian Absolute is not ‘interested’ 
in the world, possible insights in ‘his’ subjectivity or “intimations” of such 
an Absolute would be existentially irrelevant. An Aristotelian-style Absolute 
or a  Designer of the finely-tuned universe cannot do more than explain 
the general teleology of the universe. It cannot be turned into existentially 
relevant God, because one important thing that Aristotle has shown by 
postulating the existence of the Unmoved Mover is that a  ‘non-religious’ 
Absolute, lacking moral or agathological attributes, may fulfil the role of the 
explanans of the alleged teleology of the universe.
However, an existentially irrelevant Absolute is unlikely to be of interest 
for religious believers, because they are not primarily interested in finding 
the answer to the question: ‘how did it all come about’, but to the question: 
‘where is it all heading’, and how the telos of the universe is related to the 
telos of their own individual existence. It is clearly a mistake to think that 
religion serves the purely epistemic needs of the people, satisfying their 
curiosity about the way the world came into being or who is responsible for 
the way the world operates. Arguably, even in the distant past when people 
ascribed to supernatural agency responsibility for the order of the seasons, 
the rising and setting of the Sun, for the rain and the drought, they were not 
interested in these phenomena in the existentially detached way a modern 
scientist might be, but they were interested in them as life-giving forces, 
whose very existence made them believe that someone cares about them 
or disapproves of their actions, and therefore their own existence may have 
some deeper meaning and some telos, other than survival for one more day. 
Only in this way one can explain why the growing awareness of the ability of 
science to account for the facts which in the past might have been ‘explained’ 
by reference to supernatural agency does not diminish in a dramatic way 
the tendency of people to believe in a theistic God or the Ultimate Reality 
conceived in some other way.
Ostensibly a ‘religious mind’ is not primarily interested in the explanation 
of natural phenomena by the reference to efficient causes, but is interested 
in an existentially relevant understanding – by reference to final causes – of 
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the teleological nature of our axiological consciousness: our perceiving of 
the world in a non-detached way, as a value-laden world-for-us, as valuable 
when, and only when, viewed from particular subjective viewpoint of self-
conscious subjects. To put it in a more Shakespearean manner, a religious 
mind perceives the world as a stage on which the drama of one’s existence 
takes place. But the meaning of one’s existence cannot be extracted from 
explanations of the origin or the workings of the ‘stage’ in terms of efficient 
causality, unless they also happen to entail answers regarding the telos and 
thus ultimate meaning of the ‘play’ of human existence, as is the case in 
the religious stories of creation. But science can say nothing definite about 
the telos and thus ultimate meaning of my existence, because this can be 
defined only by reference to some values, some ‘good’ towards which my 
existence is directed, and natural science cannot ‘explain’ values, because 
final causes do not belong to its domain. Thus a religious mind is neutral 
as to the explanation of the facts about the physical universe (‘the stage’), 
hence Thornhill-Miller and Millican can stay reassured about the ability 
of adherents of first-order religions to “remaining fully committed to the 
enterprise of natural science” (p. 46). But a religious mind cannot remain 
fully detached from its existential concerns, limiting itself to Aristotelian 
contemplation of the “luminous, second-order ultimate reality of some kind 
that yet lies beyond the comprehension of all our individual efforts to point 
to it” (p. 49). Therefore, unless we want to engage in an implausible argument 
which starts with an admission that religion may after all be ‘natural’, because 
it does not seem to go away, and end with a recommendation that it should 
be replaced with a second-order religion which lacks nearly all the relevant 
characteristics of first-order religions to which billions of people adhere to, 
we have to accept that religious belief has to, above all, shed light on the 
question of the ultimate meaning of human existence, and this by reference to 
human values, not merely facts about the physical universe. For this reason, 
religious belief cannot lack soteriological/eschatological, metanoetic/
transformational, relational/inter-subjective, and other existentially relevant 
aspects, or else it is unlikely to appeal to adherents of first-order religions.
We have already raised the issue of the inability of second-order religion 
based solely on the Fine-Tuning Argument to be a source of meaning when 
it comes to human soteriological and eschatological concerns about our 
finiteness and mortality. Another specifically religious concern – one that 
bothered Kant – has to do with our awareness of our moral weakness and our 
limited moral perfectibility, combined with apparently ‘natural’ teleological 
inclination to be compelled by an ideal and to seek the ultimate good, while 
acting on this inclination is in most cases doomed to failure. Therefore 
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providing a  context for spiritual growth or metanoetic transformation  – 
‘transformation from self-centredness to other-centredness’, to use John 
Hick’s cross-cultural formulation  – is perhaps the one aspect of religious 
belief that is universal across all religious traditions. Nota bene, this 
transformational aspect is in most cases closely related to the soteriological/
eschatological one, since metanoia, conversion or achieving freedom from 
‘craving’ or attachment, is usually considered to be the condition of salvation/
liberation. In both cases, religious traditions provide some vision of the 
ultimate goal or at least a ‘path’ and direction in which one needs to proceed 
to actualise one’s potential for inner transformation. For this reason spiritual 
paradigms or role models serving as guides on the path of transformation 
also typically constitute an  essential part of religious traditions. While 
in some religious traditions (e.g., in certain Protestant denominations), 
belief itself may be all-important (although the affirmation of belief may 
at the same time be treated as a kind of ‘conversion’), in most traditions, 
paradigmatically in most strands of Buddhism, all aspects of religion play 
an auxiliary role in the spiritual transformation.
This brings us to the famous Buddhist metaphor of a  finger pointing 
at the moon, taken from Surangama Sutra, influential especially in the 
Chinese Chan Buddhism, which Thornhill-Miller and Millican utilise 
to conceptualise their view of the relationship between religious beliefs 
constituting particular religious traditions and the ‘second order Ultimate 
Reality’. Their discussion of their Maxim of the Moon  – poetic and 
rhetorically forceful  – fills the final pages of the essay, and brings their 
argument to a  close, summing up well both the critical and constructive 
components of their project. Everything we have said so far about second-
order religion finds its confirmation in Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s 
interpretation of this metaphor.
They start with rightly pointing out that the metaphor “cautions us 
against the blinding force of human cognitive bias by suggesting that all 
our pursuits of knowledge – including all our religions – are like ‘fingers 
pointing at the moon’, while all too often “we mistake our own finger for 
the moon and allow it to eclipse our view” (p. 49). However, what follows 
is a  reading that expresses better Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s than 
Buddhist understanding as to what this metaphor is meant to imply as 
an instruction for an adept of Buddhism. Our authors interpret the metaphor 
as above all recommending radical apophaticism or agnosticism with regard 
to what can be understood and communicated about the ultimate reality 
by means of human religious concepts which give rise to diverse religious 
traditions. Making a  link between the metaphor and their own project of 
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removing irrational elements from religious belief systems, they write: 
“once we have rationally removed all the overlapping fingers associated with 
our different religions, there may be no distinguishing traits left to view” 
(p. 49). And yet, for some reason – perhaps once more becoming aware that 
their second-order religious belief might turn out to be empty of content 
and thus an  improbable candidate for replacement to first-order religious 
beliefs – Thornhill-Miller and Millican attempt to qualify this apophaticism, 
suggesting that first-order religions “may also be thought to offer a reflection 
of second-order mysteries and wonders that yet still lie beyond our grasp” 
(p. 49). Whatever the meaning intended in this intricate phrase, given what 
has been said in the above two quotations, it is hard to see how Thornhill-
Miller and Millican can explain the way in which first-order religions might 
be a reflection of the Ultimate Reality.
Still, their hesitation regarding the extent of their apophaticism or 
agnosticism regarding the Ultimate Reality was well founded, because 
an  all-out agnosticism implied in their own formulas would be out of 
place even in the context of Buddhism. Ascribing apophatic tendencies to 
Buddhism is, of course, uncontroversial, given that according to canonical 
sources Buddha consequently refused to comment about the nature of the 
Ultimate Reality (even though his Mahayana followers ended up developing 
a  sophisticated trikaya metaphysics). What is controversial in Thornhill-
Miller’s and Millican’s reading of this metaphor is not so much what is in the 
text, but what is missing from it. What is the main point of the metaphor? 
What lesson is a  Buddhist expected to draw from it? The conclusion 
presupposed in Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s ‘Maxim of the Moon’, that 
he should refrain from holding any particular religious beliefs specific to any 
particular religious tradition? Really? And only that? Surely not. After all, 
the metaphor is employed by Buddhists who always do belong to particular 
religious traditions and hold variety of religious beliefs which guide them in 
their spiritual practice aimed at metanoetic transformation and liberation. 
The main message of this metaphor is not negative (proscribing particular 
religious beliefs), but positive (prescribing spiritual practice, rather than 
just thinking and talking about the Ultimate Reality). The message of the 
metaphor is thus: do not just read, think and talk about the Buddha and 
Buddha-nature, because that will be like focusing your attention on the 
finger pointing to the moon. Instead, follow the path of spiritual discipline 
which will lead you to actually becoming Buddha, ‘realising’ the Ultimate 
Reality, which will be an equivalent of actually seeing the moon, rather than 
a  finger. But such message presupposes quite particular religious beliefs: 
that the moon is actually there, and that it can be seen at the culminating 
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point of a  spiritual journey of metanoetic transformation, undertaken by 
an  adept within the context of particular tradition defined by particular 
belief systems, sets of practices, institutions, etc., etc..
Thus, at the end, what is missing in Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s 
interpretation of the Buddhist metaphor of the finger pointing at the moon 
is precisely the same thing that is missing from their second-order religion, 
and which is there in Buddhism and other first-order religious traditions, 
namely soteriological/eschatological aspect (e.g., belief in the possibility 
of achieving Nirvana), metanoetic/transformational aspect (affirmation of 
centrality of certain spiritual practices aimed at liberation), and relational/
inter-subjective aspects (this will depend on the conception of the Ultimate 
Reality, but even in Buddhism which does not presuppose an existence of 
a Deity, practitioners adopt certain enduring relational attitude annunciated 
in the Buddhist initiation: “I take refuge in Buddha; I take refuge in Dharma; 
I take refuge in Sangha”).
All these fundamental aspects of religious belief will have particular 
doxastic expressions, but the message of the metaphor of the finger and 
the moon remains universally valid: religious beliefs are only sign-posts 
on a  spiritual path leading towards the union with the Ultimate Reality 
towards which the sign-posts only point, hence holding religious beliefs is 
just a  point of departure of a  spiritual journey, and does not exhaust the 
meaning of being religious. For this reason, attempting to establish the 
epistemic rationality of religious belief on a  model of objective, scientific 
rationality, even for the price of emptying religious belief of its specifically 
religious content, would be like reading the metaphor of the finger and the 
moon in the following way. Since diverse religious beliefs are just different 
fingers pointing at the moon, typically eclipsing it, rather than disclosing it, 
a rational religious belief should consist in refraining from these particular 
first-order beliefs, and accepting that “there may be another vision of the 
moon, as a  luminous, second-order ultimate reality of some kind that yet 
lies beyond the comprehension of all our individual efforts to point to it”. 
And the only reason for adopting such a novel apophatic or agnostic attitude 
is that the postulated Designer of our allegedly finely-tuned universe may 
turn out to be a  good candidate for the Ultimate Reality (‘the moon’), 
although we will probably never know it, because there is no reason to think 
that there is a way to get to actually ‘see’ the moon, given that all alleged 
evidence of ‘perceived supernatural agency’ and all theistic arguments are 
inconclusive, while the Fine-Tuning Argument does not provide a basis for 
belief in an Ultimate Reality religiously conceived. And besides, why accept 
that there is a moon to be seen in the first place? After all, once we have 
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accepted that the fingers of first-order religious traditions do not show the 
moon, but rather eclipse it, why to think that there is a moon? Perhaps the 
fingers do not refer to anything outside themselves, other than to the human 
needs which – in some Freudian fashion – gave rise to them (i.e., religious 
beliefs and traditions) as their efficient causes? Thus at the end, even the 
claim that the ‘fingers’ of first-order religious traditions ‘eclipse’ the Ultimate 
Reality turns out to be hard to defend.
To sum up, it seems that the only element of a  rational second-order 
belief based on the Fine-Tuning Argument that is beyond criticism is the 
‘bare’ Designer of the finely-tuned universe that looks more like Aristotle’s 
Unmoved Mover after an apophatic diet, than a theistic God or the Ultimate 
Reality of oriental religions that religious believers have in mind affirming 
their religious commitment. Therefore, in order to have some positive 
content, a  Universalist religious belief of the type Thornhill-Miller and 
Millican seem to have in mind, needs to be grounded in something more 
than the Fine-Tuning Argument, and this ‘something’ may be our axiological 
consciousness.
IV. RATIONALITY OF FIRST-ORDER RELIGIOUS BELIEF 
AND AGATHEISTIC PLURALISM
Branden Thornhill-Miller’s and Peter Millican’s hypothesis of second-
order religious belief is motivated by twin concerns about alleged irrationality 
of first-order religious beliefs, and about their purported divisive and 
conflictual nature. Hence, in the remaining part of the paper, I will indicate 
briefly how an  agatheist may go about addressing their concerns, while 
at the same time creating favourable conditions for constructive global 
ethical dialogue of adherents of various worldviews and religions. Much of 
what I have to say has already been implied in my critical remarks about 
Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s project.
4.1. The nature and diversity of first-order agatheistic religious belief
My reply to Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s concern about irrationality of 
a commitment to a first-order religious tradition boils down to a suggestion 
that to the extent agatheistic religious belief is presupposed in it as its 
doxastic core, its belief system, if internally coherent, may be shown to be 
rational, despite there being a plurality of such belief systems.
Returning to our picture of a doxastic ladder, with descending justificatory 
dependence, the nature of agatheistic religious belief may be argued to be 
such that it is reasonable to assume that more than one ‘ladder’ of a rational 
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religious belief system may be ‘hanged’ at the ‘ceiling’ of the fundamental 
agatheistic belief. In other words, the fundamental agatheistic belief may 
constitute the epistemic foundation of a number of different religious belief 
systems.
In order to make sense of such a picture of the epistemology of religious 
belief, one has to begin by considering the following proposition. Of its 
nature, a  religious belief system specific to a  given religious tradition 
cannot be a  product of some ‘complete revelation’ as if the ‘ladder’ of its 
complete doxastic system has been lowered down from heaven without 
creative contribution on the part of its adherents, neither can it be the sole 
product of abductive reasoning, starting from the facts about the physical 
universe and ending up with a complete system of beliefs about the Ultimate 
Reality, for the same reasons, discussed earlier, for which the Fine-Tuning 
Argument cannot provide a sufficient basis for a full-fledged religious belief 
system. Therefore, I  submit, there is no better way to conceive of various 
religious belief systems than as products of the ‘meeting of minds’: human 
and Divine. Given the disparity between Divine mind and human mind 
stipulated in the religious conceptions of the Absolute, and the linguistic 
nature and historicity of human reason, even if the possibility of the 
Absolute self-disclosing itself to rational creatures in Nature, Scripture, 
History and religious experience is taken for granted, in order to make sense 
of the generation of the entire religious belief systems we need to presuppose 
that it is the human subjects, through their employment of agathological 
imagination as a rational faculty proper to all human beings, guided by the 
logic of perfect being philosophy, who form their beliefs about the Absolute 
in accordance with their sense of what is fitting to believe about the Absolute. 
The employment of agathological imagination in the formation of religious 
beliefs is indispensible, because religious beliefs are neither taken by the 
belief-holders to be beliefs about physical objects, nor are they beliefs about 
abstracts objects, nor beliefs about purely intentional objects like a work of 
art, but instead belong to a domain that is sui generis, and is such that in 
its exploration imagination must precede rational analysis. It is due to the 
involvement of imagination in the religious belief formation that religious 
language is ultimately irreducibly metaphorical, analogical and symbolic, 
and thus unavoidably anthropomorphic and always in need of purification 
by a combination of eminence and remotion (Aquinas’s via eminentiae and 
via remotionis), that is by acknowledgement that the terms we use pertain 
to God always in a higher manner than we can actually conceive of, and 
by the removal of creaturely imperfections from our descriptions of the 
Absolute. Needless to say, this distinctive nature of religious belief, and the 
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corresponding distinctive character of religious language, combined with 
the unavoidably perspectival, sociohistorical situatedness of believers as 
associated with particular times, places, cultures and languages, are bound 
to generate a diversity of religious concepts and beliefs.
Whatever the context in which particular religious beliefs are formed 
in various times and places – be it individual religious experiences or the 
activity of great religious figures as geniuses of agathological imagination – 
there is no other way such beliefs might be widely accepted than by being 
‘recognised’ as representing the optimal way of conceiving the nature of the 
Absolute and its relation to the world and humanity, where the ‘optimal way’ 
indicates an attempt at ‘reading God’s mind’ or approximating ‘God’s eye 
view’ of the matter. But the ability to ‘recognise’ a  particular proposition 
about God or the Ultimate Reality as ‘true’ and thus worthy of assent, or 
a particular interpretation of a fragment of the sacred scriptures as ‘correct’ 
and thus worthy of belief, or for that matter, the ability to ‘recognise’ the 
Divine presence in one’s own religious experience or in the activity of 
a  great religious figure, presupposes having an  a  priori concept of God 
or the Ultimate Reality as the ultimate good. Without being, prior to 
experience, in possession of such a concept, we would not be able to make 
an  agathological judgment, whether what we are dealing with is ‘good 
enough’ to be associated with God, otherwise we would have no basis for 
differentiation between God and something towards which an  attitude 
that accords God would be inappropriate. It is, thus, my contention that all 
particular beliefs about the relation of God or the Ultimate Reality to the 
world, humanity, and to the belief-holder, are being formed and shaped by 
agathological imagination, and are being done so continuously, since our 
concept of the Ultimate Reality is necessarily an open, ‘limetic’, and hence 
also ‘contested’ concept, which can never be ‘exhausted’ by the human 
mind. This ‘inexhaustibility’ of the concept of God – corresponding to the 
inexhaustibility of the reality of God, well captured by the term ‘Divine 
plenitude’  – is yet another factor that explains the diversity of religious 
beliefs, as well as the evolving nature of religious beliefs in the course of 
history. In other words, the very nature of the Ultimate Reality as the ‘object’ 
of religious belief, coupled with the nature of human subjects of religious 
belief – as endowed with limited, linguistic, historical reason – makes us 
expect what we actually see: the diversity and evolving nature of religious 
belief systems. The importance of the sociohistorical situatedness of human 
subjects who shape their religious beliefs by exercising their agathological 
imagination cannot be overemphasised in this context, because religious 
beliefs are rarely beliefs of the kind Aristotle formed about his Absolute, as 
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a ‘thought thinking itself ’. Instead, religious beliefs are typically beliefs about 
‘God-for-us’, beliefs situating God vis-à-vis the believers in their particular 
context. Hence, the form most religious beliefs are likely to take will reflect 
the particular existential conditions of those who formed them, in a way 
that does not stand in contradiction with each believer’s conviction that his 
belief is an optimal expression of truth about God available to him, because 
a  believer has no other option, but to rely on his present agathological 
intuitions regarding the nature of God and God’s relation to the world and 
humanity.
Nowhere is the impact of ever-changing existential conditions of belief-
holders on the content of religious beliefs better documented than in the 
sacred scriptures of various religious traditions, which bear witness to the 
evolving nature of religious belief systems. For example, a parochial view 
of God as a  tribal Israelite Divinity, to be found in some sections of the 
Pentateuch, from whom action in the spirit of favouritism is to be expected, 
even if that would entail allegedly approving a slaughter of the inhabitants of 
the entire Canaanite towns (cf. Deuteronomy 7.1-2; 20.16-18), could not be 
more different than the already universalist monotheistic vision of Deutero-
Isaiah, who proclaims that the entire world is the dominion of Yahweh, 
drawing this conclusion from the belief that God is the sole creator of the 
universe (“It is I who made the earth and created mankind on it” – Isaiah 
45:12). If one wishes to take these two visions of God as instances of the 
self-revelation of God to the people of Israel, surely one has to acknowledge 
that it would be hard to conceive of the possibility of God ‘revealing himself ’ 
to the Israelites as a God of the entire universe at a much earlier stage of their 
history, before they had an opportunity to come, as exiles, into an intense 
contact with the cosmopolitan world of the Neo-Babylonian Empire, and 
with the universalist mindset of Cyrus the Great, both of which may be said 
to shape the agathological imagination of Deutero-Isaiah in a way analogical 
to that which made the universalist turn of the Jewish followers of Jesus of 
Nazareth, like the apostles Paul and Peter, possible.
A similar conceptual evolution is even more evident in the Vedas, the 
oldest of which apparently presuppose a  polytheistic view of the religion 
of nature, hence the contrast with the vision of the Ultimate Reality found 
in the later Upanishads, informed by the mystical traditions of the Indian 
sub-continent, could not be more dramatic.
Needless to say, in such cases the sacred scriptures may be interpreted 
in a coherent way by reading the earlier texts through the lenses of the later 
developed views of the Absolute, which at the moment of the reading of the 
scriptures are taken by the adherents of the given tradition to approximate in 
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an optimal way the ultimate truth about the Absolute. If we add to this picture 
the revolutionary aspects of the Buddha’s religious and social teaching, that 
includes challenging social inequalities sanctioned by the Vedic tradition – 
something that the Prophet Muhammad also did in the Arab context – it 
is hard not to be struck by the progressive nature of the evolution of 
religious belief systems. Again, such evolution can be best accounted for 
by reference to the agathological imagination of religious geniuses, whom 
their encounter with the Absolute leads to re-imagining not just the relation 
between the Ultimate Reality and our human world, but also the human 
reality as seen from ‘God’s eye viewpoint’, in its tension between ‘what is’ 
and ‘what ought to be’ or ‘what might be’. This process of agathological re-
imagining, leading to the revision of certain beliefs and practices of a given 
tradition, is thus motivated by the attempt at approximating more fully to 
‘God’s eye view’ the human way of perceiving the potentialities for good 
inherent in the human reality, and to the extent this process can be thought 
to lead adherents of a particular religious tradition to grasping more fully 
the meaning of the good that is realised completely in God or the Ultimate 
Reality, adhering to such religious tradition is consistent with adhering to 
the fundamental agatheistic belief, despite there being a plurality of such 
evolving religious traditions.
It is important to notice that it is not just by revising the canonical 
elements of the religious belief systems adhered to at an earlier stage – in 
response to new agathological insights that make certain religious beliefs 
and practices appear outdated to the belief-holders – that religious traditions 
are formed and re-formed. At least equally significant is the employment 
of agathological imagination in interpreting the canonical beliefs, texts, 
narratives and symbols in various times and places, without revising them in 
a dramatic fashion that might undermine the confidence of the believers in 
the integrity of their religious tradition and its identity over time. Here the 
scope for diversity is again considerable, although such diversity may be easily 
overlooked, precisely because this time one does not deal with fundamental 
change of the canonical elements of a religious belief system – exemplified 
by Buddhism emerging from Hinduism or Christianity emerging from 
Judaism – but instead with internal diversity within one religious tradition, 
as is the case with differences between various Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, 
Jewish and Christian ‘denominations’, interpreting differently the canonical 
beliefs, and moreover is the case with differences between individual 
adherents of the same denomination, because the agathological imagination, 
like Aristotle’s phronesis, is ultimately an  individual faculty, although its 
deliverances can be inter-subjectively communicated and debated.
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This kind of ‘horizontal’ doxastic diversity within religious traditions, 
which appears to be less dramatic, but is no less important from the 
epistemological point of view, than the diversity of religious traditions, 
is complemented by a  ‘vertical’ interpretative diversity resulting from 
evolution of interpretation of the canonical beliefs over time. One notable 
example of vertical doxastic diversity would be that of the interpretation 
of the canonical biblical belief about God being just vis-a-vis his human 
creatures. Such belief is supposed to shed light on the appropriate form of 
human relations as just or unjust, as seen from a ‘God’s eye viewpoint’. And 
yet, even without providing extensive arguments of a  historical nature  – 
mentioning the history of slavery and of the resistance to democracy should 
suffice  – it is not difficult to establish the claim that religions, including 
the Abrahamic religions, have an  (un)impressive record of opposition to 
recognition of equal worth of every human person, and to social changes 
associated with the promotion of greater social equality. However, it is clear 
that each time humanity’s horizon of agathological imagination has been 
expanding, leading to a recognition – to a greater degree – of the fundamental 
equality of human beings, the interpretations of the canonical religious 
texts and beliefs kept changing, as an expression of acknowledgement that 
the goodness and justice of God has at an earlier point in time been less 
adequately conceived.
These changes in the understanding of the agathological attributes 
ascribed to the Absolute in various religious traditions take place within 
a  hermeneutic circle, where new insights into the nature of human 
goodness affect the way we conceive of Divine goodness, and vice versa. In 
a sense, as the believers grow, expanding the horizon of their agathological 
imagination, so does their God, and in turn the ‘growing’ God challenges 
the agathological intuitions of those of his believers who did not yet ‘update’ 
their agathological beliefs in line with the new insights of the agathological 
geniuses – saints, prophets and sages – of their tradition. Such dialectical 
progress can be made sense of by reference to the intuition that is present 
in one way or the other in the majority of religious traditions, and in the 
Judeo-Christian context is expressed in the belief that human beings are 
created by God in the ‘image’ and ‘likeness’ of God (cf. Genesis 1:26-27; 
5:1-3; 9:6). The imago Dei axiom allows one to argue that even though 
God’s absolute nature  – which calls for the application of the analogy of 
proportionality in making any assertions about God on the basis of the 
qualities shared by human beings with God – seriously limits our ability to 
‘see God’s face’ in the mirror of our humanity, still at least as much of the 
trace of the Divine in humanity is discernible, namely human openness to 
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the realisation of the original potential for imitating God in his goodness 
(which is also consistent with the agatheistic identification of God with the 
ultimate good). This line of thought reinforces the conclusion that religious 
believers are always caught in a hermeneutical circle and cannot transcend 
their human condition to actually achieve a  ‘view from nowhere’ or the 
‘God’s eye view’, and base their religious belief system solely on a ‘theology 
from above’ strictly understood, if this term would be taken to refer to a set 
of propositions about the way God relates to his creatures that would have 
an ahistorically fixed meaning and so would be unable to be affected by the 
evolution of our agathological intuitions.
By now, one thing should be clear: to paraphrase Rousseau, taking God 
as God might be, and humans as they are, one should expect to see what we 
actually see: pluralism of evolving religious belief systems. To the extent God 
as Agatheos – the Ultimate Reality religiously conceived and identified with 
the Ultimate Good – is thought to infinitely transcend the limited cognitive 
and imaginative capacities of the human mind that is embodied and thus 
sociohistorically situated, the pluralism of religious beliefs is a  natural 
outcome of human efforts to articulate human understanding of God, and 
this holds whether one chooses to see the history of religion in terms of ‘man 
in search of God’ or ‘God in search of man’.
Thus, although so far we have discussed only the intensional rather 
than extensional side of the problem of religious belief, that is its possible 
meanings, rather than the existence of its referent, the reason why the above 
discussion of the nature of agatheistic religious belief was necessary is that if 
first-order religious belief is to be epistemically justifiable in a non-fideistic 
way, it is unavoidably going to be this kind of belief that is part of one among 
many evolving religious belief systems justified in a similar way.
4.2. The nature and epistemic justification 
of first-order agatheistic religious belief
From what has been said so far about what can and what can not constitute 
the possible epistemic ground of the first-order religious belief system, it 
follows that it is a mistake to assume that each particular religious belief 
that constitutes a  part of a  religious belief system should be justified 
separately by reference to some ‘conclusive evidence’ of empirical nature. 
Instead, I submit that the epistemic justification of religious belief should 
be conceived along the lines of the metaphor of a doxastic ladder hanging 
at the ceiling of the fundamental agatheistic belief in the Ultimate Reality 
as the ultimate good. All particular beliefs of a given religious belief system 
are justified against the background of their antecedent probability relative 
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to what the fundamental agatheistic belief may be thought to entail, that is 
they are justified to the extent they are part of an internally coherent belief 
system which coheres with the fundamental agatheistic belief. In practice, 
particular religious beliefs are added to the system by great religious figures 
as geniuses of agathological imagination who have new insights regarding 
what God or the Ultimate Reality being the ultimate good might imply, 
and who also typically are taken to have some kind of religious experience 
understood as an  instance of an  ‘encounter’ with the Divine. But these 
new beliefs have its primary justificatory ground not in the experiences 
themselves, since such ground would be insufficient for justification, but 
in the fundamental agatheistic belief. Therefore, what an  epistemologist 
of religious belief has to concentrate on in the first place is the possibility 
of epistemic justification of the fundamental agatheistic belief itself, 
which in turn grounds all other first-order religious beliefs that may also 
be epistemically supported by religious experience to the extent religious 
experience is itself made antecedently probable by the fundamental 
agatheistic belief, and is consistent with it.
Accordingly, the main claim of this section of the paper is that agatheistic 
religious belief can be shown to be rational by recourse to a combination of 
two lines of argument: the first one which postulates the existence of Agatheos 
as the ultimate good to which our axiological consciousness points, and the 
second one which is supplementary, and points to the experiential factors, 
namely the agathonic feeling accompanying agatheistic religious attitude 
and religious experiences of the Divine presence.
Thus, the main argument in favour of rationality of agatheistic religious 
belief starts with identifying the fundamental ‘fact’ about our axiological 
consciousness, our directedness towards the good, as “that for which 
everything is done”, identified already by Plato (Gorgias 468b; cf. also 
Symposium 205e–6a, Republic 505d–e, Philebus 65a). Aristotle’s concept 
of intrinsic good as desired for itself and occupying the supreme position 
in the hierarchy of human ends, something we would choose and pursue 
whether or not it helps to bring about further goods (cf. Nicomachean Ethics 
I.2 1094a19, I.6 1096b18-19, I.7 1097b2-5), although taking on a different 
meaning due to a  different metaphysical context, confirms Plato’s insight 
about the irreducibly value-laden nature of our attitude towards reality. 
While Aristotle’s account of a flourishing life includes a vision of a purely 
contemplative existence, it is clear that far more realistic and existentially 
relevant is his vision of an  active life, deeply engaged with the world, in 
which the desire to know is always inseparably linked with seeking some 
good, according to the axiom: to know a good, is to desire it.
238 JANUSZ SALAMON
A crucial step in our argument is to reject the possibility of a satisfactory 
scientific explanation of this axiological dimension of our consciousness that 
would make it unproblematic, leaving no questions unanswered. And this 
is the right moment to draw the attention to the opening quotations from 
Albert Einstein and Isaiah Berlin. I deliberately chose two authors who did 
not consider themselves theists, yet – while being exemplary rationalists – 
refused to identify themselves as critics of religion as such or as atheists,22 
as did Hilary Putnam who voiced similar opinions on the subject while 
remaining a  non-theist and characterising the God of his own Jewish 
religious practice as a “human construct” created “in response to demands 
that we do not create”.23 Identifying oneself as a theist or not is beside the 
point in the above quotations which point to the normative aspect of the 
‘human world’, of the world of conscious subjective experience, that is not 
reducible to the facts about the physical universe, and as such cannot be 
explained exhaustively by science, while presenting itself to us as a central 
human concern that is hard to dismiss without making sense of it or giving it 
some meaning that would be relevant to our first-person perspective on the 
world and our own being in the world. It seems that it is this characteristic 
tendency of human beings as ‘sense-making’ or ‘meaning-giving’ animals 
that makes our minds restless and does not allow us to give up the search for 
the ultimate meaning even in the areas where there is perhaps no scientific 
knowledge to be had, and therefore also no possibility of reliance on the 
scientific method, and no possibility of conflict with science, as Einstein, 
Berlin, and Hume – with his formula that one cannot derive ‘ought’ from 
‘is’ – seem to agree, even though some contemporary naturalists may wish 
to believe that science can determine human values and human ends.
The reason why science cannot either confirm or disconfirm religious 
belief is that religious belief – even if ‘acquired’ in the context of a religious 
community and drawing on the resources of a religious tradition – is about 
the aspect of reality that is essentially subjective, expressing our particular, 
first-person, specifically human perspective on the world. Religious belief 
pertains primarily to the realm of values, the realm of the ultimate good, 
not to the realm of facts about the physical universe, whose phenomena are 
explained by science giving account of the causal laws that explain them. But 
the axiological dimension of the human consciousness presents itself to us 
22 Asked about it, Isaiah Berlin explained: “dry atheists seem to me blind and deaf to 
some forms of profound human experience.” (Cf. Isaiah Berlin and Ramin Jahanbegloo, 
Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1991), p. 110.)
23 Hilary Putnam, Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life: Rosenzweig, Buber, Levinas, 
Wittgenstein (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), p. 6.
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as irreducibly teleological, not efficient-causal, therefore there is nothing for 
science to explain in the realm to which religious beliefs – and all agathological 
beliefs, whether held by a religious believer or by an atheist – pertain. For 
this reason, to attempt to take out religious belief from its subjective, first-
person context, in order to make it appear more rational than it actually is, is 
like taking a fish out of the water to make it easier to observe. From the fact 
that it may be possible to think of a religious belief that would have a stronger 
claim to rationality than the kind of religious belief that is actually held by 
a typical religious believer, it does not follow that we have a good reason to 
replace the former with the latter, as Thornhill-Miller and Millican propose. 
At the end it may turn out that these two different kinds of beliefs simply 
do not capture the same dimension of ‘reality’ in question, as the ‘more 
rational’ beliefs about the acoustic and mathematical aspects of the Art of 
the Fugue cannot replace the ‘less rational’ beliefs about the music formed in 
the mind of the listener of Bach’s masterpiece. The objective and subjective 
point of view of the matter are not reducible to each other. Something of this 
duality seems to be present in Thornhill-Miller’s and Millican’s approach to 
religious belief, as if the chief reason why they choose to focus on fine-tuning 
is that they want to put the spotlight on that dimension of religious belief 
which is most easily objectifiable and thus conducive of rational justification 
according to the paradigm of objective scientific rationality, and this despite 
the fact that it turns out to be the least relevant aspect of religious belief 
from the believer’s point of view, who, as it were, is interested in the ‘music’ 
(the subjective aspect), not in its physical medium (the objectifiable aspect) 
of the phenomenon under consideration. Religious belief is ‘at home’ in 
the domain of subjectivity (or better to say, inter-subjectivity), and both 
the professional critics and professional defenders of religion who for the 
sake of their theistic or atheistic ‘apologetics’ bring to the fore the aspects of 
religious belief that are most ‘objectifiable’, miss the point of what religion 
is really about, and fight their battles somewhere on the outskirts of the 
‘garden of faith’ which seems to be flourishing as well as ever, taking on new 
colours as generations of believers pass.
However, by affirming that science cannot confirm or disconfirm 
religious belief, or that science is of no help when it comes to making sense of 
our axiological consciousness, I do not mean to imply that our directedness 
towards the good, which makes us endlessly seek some good, and leaves us 
always dissatisfied, looking forward towards the realisation of some higher 
good not yet realised, could not be made sense of without reference to the 
ultimate good religiously conceived. On the contrary, every question that 
leads some people in the direction of a religious answer can be answered in 
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a non-religious way. Moreover, there is always an absurdist option available 
consisting in acceptance that the myth of Sisyphus expresses well the truth 
about the human condition, thus endorsing a ‘tragic’ vision that there simply 
exists an ill-fit between our way of perceiving the world – resulting perhaps 
from our evolutionary development – and what reality can actually offer. 
The absurdist answer recognises the fact of our axiological open-endedness, 
and our directedness towards the horizon of the ultimate good, while 
denying that there exists anything real and realisable that corresponds to our 
concept of the ultimate good. An absurdist – in a style of Camus – does not 
have to deny that many ‘parts’ of our human world, including morality, may 
be meaningful, but concludes that there is nothing contradictory in ‘parts’ 
being meaningful, while the ‘whole’ lacking ultimate meaning. Presumably, 
a  typical non-religious and non-absurdist response to the issue of ‘the 
ultimate good’ is likely to take a form of some variation on the Aristotelian 
theme of ‘human flourishing’ that is in principle possible in the present 
human condition. But a religious mind finds all the non-religious options, 
including the Aristotelian one, unsatisfactory as ways of making sense of 
the riddle of our axiological consciousness, and conceptualises in religious 
terms the ultimate good as the telos of human life, most likely portraying 
the human condition in a way akin to Augustine’s intuition expressed at the 
very beginning of his Confessions that portrays God as a kind of powerful 
‘magnet’ of the ultimate good that draws the creatures to himself as the 
source and the end of all that is good: “for Thou hast formed us for Thyself, 
and our hearts are restless till they find rest in Thee.”24
But how to describe this choice between various available ‘options’ in 
epistemic terms? Given that variety of worldviews may be coherent with 
the undisputable findings of science, and given that each of them may be 
internally coherent, it seems there can be no other ultimate basis of this fateful 
choice between various comprehensive worldviews – differing primarily in 
the way they define the ultimate good and the ultimate meaning of human 
existence – than the agathological imagination that leads various people to 
choose various ‘agathological landscapes’ as agathologically optimal, or to 
put it differently, as conceptualising in the optimal way the potentialities for 
good inherent in the human reality. One might ask, how does such a choice 
differ from a fideistic ‘leap of faith’ into epistemic darkness in which there 
is no knowledge to be had? There are a number of differences. Firstly, the 
choice is of such a  nature that it is unavoidable: every human being that 
leads a  life that is to some degree an examined life, has a  comprehensive 
24 St. Augustine, Confessions, trans. by Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), p. 24.
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worldview which includes such elements as an understanding of the ultimate 
good and the ultimate meaning of one’s existence, which cannot be settled 
in an objective scientific manner. Secondly, the choice is not really arbitrary, 
because it is a choice between various conceptions of the ultimate good, and 
it is in all probability a choice that is made in manner that could be best 
analysed in externalist terms, that is as only to a limited degree voluntary 
and conscious. Thirdly, the choice itself, and the life in accordance with 
that choice, is accompanied by this experiential element that we called the 
‘agathonic feeling’ that serves as a kind of agathological conscience, which at 
the same time can be taken to be the only epistemic compass available in the 
realm of the good. ‘Agathonic feeling’ accompanies ‘agathological choices’ 
of every subject, whatever his worldview, but in the context of ‘religious life’, 
especially if it takes a form of intense spiritual practice leading to a progress 
on the path of metanoetic transformation, there will be many occasions 
to be aware of this ‘inner testimony’ manifesting itself in variety of subtle 
ways, indicating the position of the ‘traveller’ vis-à-vis the ‘destination’ of 
the ‘journey’, that is the Ultimate Reality identified with the ultimate good. 
Fourthly, and lastly, it is not the case that the agathological beliefs, whether 
leading to a religious or non-religious worldview, are immune to rational 
criticism, in the way the religious beliefs of a  fideist might be, since it is 
presumed that in order to deserve to be called rational, religious beliefs have 
to constitute a part of a belief system that is internally coherent and coherent 
with the undisputed findings of science.25
There is one more fundamental reason which can be clearly discerned in 
the religious literature as a sort of ‘explanation’ of the inclination of religious 
mind to prefer a  religious conceptualisation of the ultimate good, rather 
than a non-religious one, but this ‘reason’ is not independent of the exercise 
of agathological imagination, but only reveals its inner logic, that is the 
logic of perfect being philosophy. It is the intuitive inclination to perceive 
the present human condition and the present circumstances of human 
existence as sub-optimal, unsatisfactory and disappointing. This inclination 
and its opposite capture well the fundamental difference between Plato’s and 
25 It seems that the dynamics of this choice between various visions of the ultimate 
good, and the corresponding choice between various comprehensive worldviews, is 
somewhat akin to what Wittgenstein might have in mind when applying his idea of ‘form 
of life’ and the corresponding ‘language game’ to the case of religious belief. He also 
thought that the choice is being made between the entire ‘doxastic ladders’ or conceptual 
frameworks, rather than by considering the rationality of particular religious beliefs (e.g., 
belief in the Last Judgment). (Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on 
Aesthetics, Psychology, Religious Belief, ed. by Cyril Barrett (Oxford: Blackwell, 1966), 
pp. 53ff.)
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Aristotle’s visions of reality and their visions of a good life, which arguably 
influenced most of the metaphysical and axiological alternatives articulated 
by Western philosophy. Again, this difference can be accounted for by the 
differences in the way Plato’s and Aristotle’s agathological imagination has 
functioned, and there is little one could do by way of rational argument 
to settle the matter which of those two approaches is more ‘rational’. 
This much is clear, a  religious mind perceives as rationally unacceptable 
the discrepancy between teleology of our axiological consciousness  – 
presenting itself to us as categorical and therefore difficult to explain away 
by reference to social factors – and the practical impossibility of realisation 
of the good to which our axiological consciousness points as the telos of our 
existence. The impression that teleology identified in our mental life makes 
on a  religious believer is being reinforced by the impression of teleology 
discerned in the workings of the universe (‘the starry sky above me and the 
moral law within me’), so that when a naturalist suggests that the workings 
of the universe can at the end be explained entirely in efficient-causal way, 
a religious believer faces a choice between a causally closed view of reality 
accounted for by references to efficient causes and an essentially teleological 
view of reality. But being aware that science can never conclusively confirm 
the veridicality of the former view, a  religious believer opts for the latter, 
since his agathological imagination leads him to embrace the latter option 
as agathologically preferable.
At the end, the choices between various conceptions of the ultimate 
good take a  form of a  postulate of practical reason which is an  object of 
rational belief, but the reasons for the belief are of practical nature, that is 
pertaining to our acts of will and our actions. As such, they cannot be settled 
by science, because they pertain to the question about ‘what ought to be’ or 
‘what might be’, not ‘what is’. More generally, nothing more can be done to 
establish the rationality of agathological beliefs, whether held by theists or 
atheists, than – following Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas and Kant – to 
point to the concept of the ultimate good as the transcendental condition 
of our axiological consciousness, and to see agathological beliefs as objects 
of Kantian ‘rational faith’ or, better, of rational hope. Thus, agatheism, while 
not being a form of fideism, is a form of ‘sperantism’ (from Latin sperare – to 
hope) – and so is every other comprehensive worldview, whether religious 
or naturalistic, because every worldview includes agathological beliefs that 
are objects of rational hope.
As to the evidential value of religious experience, conceived as an 
experience of the Divine presence, religious experience does play an 
important supporting role in establishing the rationality of agatheistic 
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first-order religious belief, but it cannot be treated as an  independent 
ground, because it is itself grounded in the agatheistic religious belief. 
Mystical literature testifies that mystics experiencing the presence of God 
or the Ultimate Reality, form at least three types of belief: (a) the reality that 
is experienced is supremely real, (b) the object of experience is exceedingly 
good, and (c) the object of experience appears to transcend entirely the 
mundane reality in which the subject is immersed. In order to be able to 
identify the ‘object’ of an experience as God or the Ultimate Reality, rather 
than as something else, the mystic has to possess an agatheistic concept of the 
Ultimate Reality prior to experience. In a different place I argued at length – 
pace Alston – that plurality of mystical traditions does not contradict the 
possibility of authenticity or veridicality of such experiences occurring in 
the context of a variety of religious traditions.26 I  argued in favour of the 
coherence of a view I called ‘mystical inclusivism’ which (1) allows for the 
possibility of veridical experience of God or the Ultimate Reality in a variety 
of religious traditions, but (2) avoids the radical revisionist postulates of 
Hickian pluralism, akin to the revisionism advocated by Thornhill-Miller 
and Millican, and (3) it leaves open the question whether the creed of any 
specific tradition is a better approximation to the truth about the Ultimate 
Reality than the creeds of other traditions, thus creating a space for a kind 
of pan-inclusivism as a form of religious inclusivism which acknowledges 
that everyone else is also an  inclusivist. Such pan-inclusivism is fully 
coherent with the epistemology of agatheistic religious belief presupposed 
in this paper that accommodates religious diversity without advocating 
abandoning first-order religious belief.
CONCLUSION
The possibility of a  rational agatheistic religious belief solves Thornhill-
Miller’s and Millican’s Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma: “That in so 
far as religious phenomena (e.g. miracle reports, religious experiences, or 
other apparent perceptions of supernatural agency) point towards specific 
aspects of particular religions their diversity and mutual opposition 
undermines their evidential force; while in so far as such phenomena involve 
a  ‘common core’ of similarity, they point towards a  proximate common 
cause for these phenomena that is natural rather than supernatural.” On 
the agatheistic picture, the above dilemma rests on a problematic view of 
the nature and epistemic grounds of religious belief which I have tried to 
26 Cf. Janusz Salamon, “Light Out Of Plenitude: Towards Epistemology of Mystical 
Inclusivism”, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2 (2010), pp. 141-175.
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disclose. Firstly, the ‘religious phenomena’ to which our authors point to 
do not constitute the main epistemic ground of first-order religious belief. 
Indeed, they cannot constitute such ground without being dependent on 
the fundamental agatheistic religious belief that identifies the Ultimate 
Reality with the ultimate good and which itself is not grounded in any such 
‘religious phenomena’.
Secondly, to the extent such phenomena are at all called upon by religious 
believers in the capacity of ‘evidence’ for the existence of the ‘object’ of religious 
belief – and they rarely are – they do not and can not “point towards specific 
aspects of particular religions”, if by this we mean establishing the truth of 
particular religious beliefs about the Absolute and its relation to the world, 
since no empirical data can confirm religious beliefs about the Absolute 
held by adherents of any religions. Any such empirical data, in order to be 
interpreted as evidence of anything related to the Absolute, presupposes the 
possession by the subject of an a priori concept of the Absolute which cannot 
itself be derived entirely from empirical data. In practice, such ‘religious 
phenomena’ play a different role than Thornhill-Miller and Millican ascribe 
to it, namely as a source of motivation, encouragement and reassurance on 
a path of spiritual development leading to metanoetic transformation, but 
this role presupposes a pre-existent religious belief, rather than grounding 
it. So conceived, religious experiences or other such ‘religious phenomena’ 
cannot be ‘opposed’ to each other, and nothing of epistemic significance 
follows from their diversity.
Thirdly, the presupposition of the ‘common core’ in diverse religious 
traditions offers no problem, if the fundamental agatheistic religious belief 
constitutes such a  ‘common core’ as it arguably does in reality. ‘Religious 
phenomena’ of the kind Thornhill-Miller and Millican refer to do not and 
can not constitute a  ‘core’ of any religious tradition, therefore similarities 
or dissimilarities between such ‘religious phenomena’ are of secondary 
relevance for the epistemology of religious belief. As to agatheistic religious 
belief as the ‘common core’ of diverse religious belief systems, such belief 
cannot be explained away by reference to any ‘natural cause’, proximate 
or otherwise. And as to the possibility of explaining away all religious 
experiences by reference to proximate causes, William Alston argued 
convincingly in his Perceiving God that an ability to identify a proximate 
cause of a religious experience does not exclude the possibility that this 
experience is a veridical perception of the Divine presence, since God may 
feature further back in the chain of causes. When I  see a  tree, there are 
proximate causes of my perceiving the tree other than the tree itself, and 
specifying how proximate a cause of a perception has to be – especially when 
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the Divine presence is supposed to be the object of experience – to make the 
perception veridical cannot be settled by way of philosophical argument. In 
short, we have a ‘common core’ and diversity, but no dilemma.
By now the connection between agatheistic vision of religious belief 
and the global ethical dialogue should be clear. Agatheism sees religious 
belief systems as grounded in the exercise of agathological imagination that 
struggles to give an expression to our concern with human values and human 
good. Thus, agatheism locates religion not in the realm of extraordinary 
‘religious phenomena’ that might be perceived as exotic and irrelevant by 
an atheist, but rather in the sphere of central human concerns which bother 
every human being. In this sphere all human beings are on par, because 
science cannot settle the most vital matters of the ultimate good and the 
ultimate meaning of human existence. It is also the sphere in which human 
beings  – communicating and justifying to each other their agathological 
beliefs – have to find the ways to live a solidary life on a global scale, mindful 
of the global ethical imperative to act so as to promote the chances of all to 
realise in their life the potentialities for good inherent in human reality.
